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One thing I have always maintained is that a good water and sewer system improves the
whole lifestyle of the village—starting with health. I was born and raised in Unalakleet
and I remember the days when we had to haul our own water and sewer, and the amount
of time that it took. Having a good water and sewer system for thirty years now has
helped us greatly improve the quality of life by freeing up people to pursue other things
. . . . All of this ties in with our past leadership, their vision and their own desire to
develop an economic base for Unalakleet. By planning a system that eliminates the time
involved for individuals to care for our own water and sewer needs, it freed up the time
and manpower to plan instead for other development . . . . I think having water and
sewer years ago and planning for all the other services early has everything to do with
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Glossary
ANHB – Alaska Native Health Board
ANTHC – Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium
AVCP – Association of Village Council Presidents
Billing & Collections – A category of project activity that includes the processes used to enter
customer names, send notices or bills, record and track utility customer payments, and
communicate and enforce customer obligations to pay.
Boards or Committees – A category of project activity that includes establishing a utility board
or committee made up of community members, to set policy and provide management oversight
for the water and sanitation utility, or provide advice and policy recommendations to the city or
tribal council.
City-Tribe Cooperation – A category of project activity that includes new forms of
collaboration between the city and tribal governments to provide water and sanitation services
and the operation and maintenance of the facilities. These activities may take the form of transfer
of authority, joint operating agreements, or jointly establishing an independent utility.
Collections – An outcome indicator monitoring the amount of revenue collected from water,
sewer, flush haul, honey bucket haul and washeteria fees.
Community Involvement – An outcome indicator monitoring the participation of community
members in discussion or action related to the water or sewer system in the village either
individually; through surveys, meetings, or councils; through active community support in the
form of positive comments; or through increased customer responsibility for fees or O&M.
Condition of the Facilities – An outcome indicator monitoring the physical condition of the
water or sanitation facilities. Improvements may include routine plant maintenance, major
maintenance projects such as boiler replacement, or system upgrades such as installation of
shutoff valves, adding flush tank haul units to homes or completing a new sewage lagoon.  In
villages with honey bucket haul or flush haul systems this includes the purchase of haul vehicles.
Cost Efficiency – An outcome indicator monitoring the operational cost per unit output.
Improvements may include: a decrease in water consumption through customer education or
water line repair; improved level of service by improved maintenance; decreased demand for
repairs due to improved O&M by users; or decreased labor time to conduct monthly billing due
to software or training improvements.
EPA – U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Facility Condition – See Condition of the Facilities.
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Financial Management – An outcome indicator monitoring the financial management practices
for a utility, including, billing, collections, purchasing, record keeping, payroll taxes, accounting,
debt management, budgeting, fiscal control, or financial reporting. Improvements may include
upgrading computer software, improving bookkeeping through staff hiring or training, or
improving fiscal reporting to the council.
Financial Planning & Management – A category of project activities that relate to the financial
planning and management of a water or sanitation system, including, billing, collections,
purchasing, record keeping, payroll taxes, accounting, debt management, budgeting, fiscal
control, financial reporting, rate studies, and revenue enhancement. (See also Billing and
Collections)
IRA Council – Tribal government organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
ISER – Institute of Social and Economic Research
LGS – Local Government Specialist (Department of Community and Economic Development)
Maintenance and Facility Improvements – A category of project activity that includes
identified maintenance tasks on water and sanitation facilities, especially large irregular or
deferred maintenance projects, and identified tasks to upgrade water and sanitation facilities.
Examples include routine plant maintenance, major maintenance projects such as boiler
replacement, or system upgrades such as installation of shutoff valves, adding flush tank haul
units to homes or completing a new sewage lagoon. In villages with honey bucket haul or flush
haul systems this includes purchasing haul vehicles. The activity may include expenditure of
grant funds on extra hours for the operator, wages for assistants, contract engineers or
consultants, as well as equipment or parts.
Office Equipment – A category of project activity that includes purchasing computers and
software.
OIT – Operator in Training
O&M – Operations and maintenance
O&M Policies, Procedures or Plans – An outcome indicator monitoring the status of policies,
procedures and plans governing the operation and maintenance of a village water or sanitation
system; can include an O&M plan, a maintenance schedule, a system of record keeping or
reporting, a system for inventory and record keeping for parts, or a system for identifying and
ordering parts.
O&M Planning & Record Keeping – A category of project activity that includes development,
revision, or adoption of policies, procedures or plans related to the operation or maintenance of a
village water or sanitation system; can include development of an O&M plan, a maintenance
schedule, a system of record keeping or reporting, a system for inventory and record keeping for
parts, a system for identifying and ordering parts, or an O&M assessment.
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Operator Hours – An outcome indicator monitoring the hours per week the water and sanitation
system operators report to work.
Operator Skills – An outcome indicator monitoring the capability and experience of the
operators to operate and maintain a village water or sewer system, as indicated by certification
status, training, and experience.
Operator Support – A category of project activity that includes paying water or sanitation
operator wages from project funds.
Operator Training – A category of project activity that includes attending training workshops
or over-the-shoulder training to upgrade the knowledge, skills or certification status of water or
sanitation operators.
Ordinances – A category of project activity that includes developing and adopting an
institutional framework of utility ordinances covering topics such as management structure and
authority; utility responsibilities; customer responsibilities; rates; and collections and
enforcement procedures.
Partnership Team – A category of project activity that includes the commitment to
communicate and collaborate on project activities with various community and agency
personnel; identified team members often include the operator, utility clerk or manager, city or
tribal administrator, RWM, RUBA or LGS, VSW or ANTHC engineer, regional health
corporation staff, and consultants or company reps.
Parts & Supplies – (1) A category of project activity that includes inventorying and purchasing
critical spare parts and supplies used in the operation and maintenance of a village water or
sewer system. (2) An outcome indicator monitoring the available stock of tools, parts or supplies.
PHS – U.S. Public Health Service (IHS - Indian Health Service) formerly provided facility
construction and other assistance to villages for water and sanitation. These functions have
largely been assumed by the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium (ANTHC).
Planning, Ordinances and Procedures – A category of project activity that includes the
development, revision, or council adoption of policies, procedures or planning related to the
utility management of a village water or sewer system, including ordinances, user agreements,
customer surveys, and facility or service planning.
Policies & Planning – See Utility Policies, Procedures or Planning.
Rate Study – A category of project activity that includes data collection and analysis to analyze
utility costs, patterns of service, or consumer ability to pay, for purposes of establishing or
revising a fee schedule for water and sanitation services.
Revenue Enhancement – A category of project activity that includes strategies other than fee
collection to augment utility revenues. This may include fundraising events, budgeting a portion
of gaming or other local government revenues, or grant writing.
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RMW – Remote Maintenance Worker; RMWs are circuit-riding employees of the regional
health corporations who provide technical assistance and training to water and sanitation
operators in their region; the RMW program is coordinated statewide through the Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation.
RUBA – Rural Utility Business Advisors (Alaska Department of Community and Economic
Development) provide administrative training and assistance to clerks, managers, and boards or
councils responsible for water and sanitation utility management.
Scheduled Maintenance – An outcome indicator monitoring the performance of routine
maintenance activities as prescribed in a preventive maintenance plan for water and sanitation
facilities.
Utility Management – An outcome indicator monitoring the structures and resources for
governance or organizational management of the water or sewer facility system, including policy
making and oversight by a board or council, executive leadership, oversight and planning by a
manager or administrator, and clerical and administrative support by a manager or clerk.
Utility Management Training – A category of project activity that includes attending a
Department of Community and Economic Development training workshop on utility
management, or over the shoulder training by a RUBA or consultant focusing broadly on utility
management issues (not primarily financial management—see Financial Management above).
Utility Manager or Clerk – A category of project activity that includes creating and filling a
utility manager or clerk position to provide focus and expertise in utility administration, and
increase the time and planning devoted to it.
Utility Policies, Procedures or Planning – An outcome indicator monitoring the status of
policies, procedures or planning related to the utility management of a village water or sewer
system, including ordinances, user agreements, policies and procedures for collections, incentive
and enforcement, rate studies, customer surveys, and facility or financial planning.
VSW – Village Safe Water (Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation)
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Chapter I.  Introduction
The Alaska Native Health Board (ANHB) has a multi-year project funded by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Wastewater Management, to administer sanitation
facilities operations and maintenance (O&M) demonstration grants in rural Alaska. Nine
projects were funded in the first wave, beginning in April 1996. Nineteen projects, including
two carry-overs from the first wave, were funded in the second wave, which started in April
1997. The third and last wave, with seven projects, started in April 1998.
The Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Alaska
Anchorage is monitoring and evaluating the individual sanitation facility O&M projects and
the program overall. EPA initially funded this work; it is now funded by ANHB. The research
design and the underlying program design differ somewhat across the three phases. This report
comprises the final evaluation for the sixteen Phase II community projects for which data
collection was substantially complete as of September 30, 1999.
Phase II Communities
In 1997, 68 rural communities prepared grant applications for Phase II project funding.
The project’s Coordinating Committee identified priority themes for funding and
recommended a mix of applications addressing each theme. ANHB selected 18 applications for
Phase II funding and offered two Phase I communities continuation funding. Table 1 describes
the four Phase II themes and shows the projects by theme.
Map 1 shows the sanitation status of 191 Alaska villages, highlighting the 20 selected
for Phase II O&M projects. The communities and their current water and sewage technologies
are further described in Table 2. The communities range in population from 85 to 803.
Numbers of households served vary from 44 to 184. The average household size varies from
2.7 to 5 persons.
The communities also differ in their ability to pay for utility services. The 1990 median
household income in the twenty communities ranged from $12,083 to $34,531. In nearly half
the study communities, a quarter or more of the households had 1990 incomes of less than
$10,000. Table 3 shows the distribution of the 20 communities, by sewage technology and by
percentage of households with 1990 incomes of less than $10,000. It is not surprising that the
poorest communities have the least sophisticated technology. The communities with more
income are more diverse technologically and geographically.
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TABLE 1. PRIORITY THEMES FOR SELECTION OF THE 1997 O & M PILOT PROJECTS
Utility Management Structure
• Hiring a utility manager
• Establishing a utility board
Utility Management Education
• Training for mayor, administrators, council members
• Training for utility board members
• Training for utility manager, clerk or other staff
Utility Management Procedures, Systems, and Resources
Customer Education
• Need for utility fees or other means of financial support
• Homeowner responsibilities for O & M
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Map of community sanitation facilities is in separate PDF file.
Phase II Final Report
4
Back map
Phase II Final Report
5





    Water

















(Number of households served)
Sewage System
(Number of households served)
Chefornak NSHC city 405 5.00 $20,278 17% watering point (90) honey bucket haul (85)
Deering Maniilaq public util. 158 3.57 $15,208 10% watering point (44) honey bucket (44)
Galena TCC city 543 2.79 $28,611 13% FHT (97), piped (28),watering point
(75)
FTH (115), septic (36),honey bucket (38),
outhouse (13)
Kiana Maniilaq city 415 4.23 $28,125 30% piped (76), watering point (8) sewer (73), FTH (6), honey bucket (6)
Kongiganak YKHC tribe 349 4.90 $33,250 25% watering point (75) honey bucket (73), community haul (2)
Koyukuk TCC city 126 3.15 $13,929 38% watering point (45) honey bucket, outhouses
Mekoryuk YKHC city 192 2.81 $14,792 26% watering point (64), piped (34), FTH
(30)
honey bucket (34), sewer (31), FTH (30)
Napaskiak YKHC tribe 399 4.43 $18,750 24% watering point honey bucket
New
Stuyahok
BBAHC city 452 4.44 $12,083 18% piped (85), watering point (1) FTH (80)
Noatak Maniilaq tribe 401 4.50 $36,458 7% piped (70) sewer (70)
Nondalton BBAHC city 221 3.30 $21,750 20% piped (75) sewer (69), septic tanks (10)
Nunapitchuk YKHC city 489 4.34 $17,083 19% haul (6) flush haul (6)
Saint Michael NSHC city 341 4.28 $23,194 18% watering point honey bucket
Shaktoolik NSHC city 226 3.87 $18,438 8% piped (44) sewer (44)
Shishmaref NSHC city 542 3.83 $15,625 30% watering point, haul (20) honey bucket (), flush haul (20)
Stebbins NSHC city 475 4.65 $23,333 27% watering point (79) honey bucket hand (79)
Tanacross TCC tribe 85 3.03 $14,750 25% piped (26), watering point (21) septic tanks (24), honey bucket (19), outhouse
(12)
Tanana TCC public util. 299 2.70 $17,000 34% watering point. outhouses
Unalakleet NSHC city 803 3.45 $34,531 9% piped (184) sewer
Venetie TCC tribe 241 3.64 $14,688 39% watering point (73), piped (12) outhouses (73), sewer (12)
mean 361 3.73 $20,757 24%
Source: Alaska Department of Community and Economic Development community database and project applications
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Note: Several communities have more than one system. A community name in parentheses under a system
type indicates that fewer households use that system.
Program Implementation
Five ANHB staff members visited the demonstration communities and worked with
them to prepare partnership agreements. While the dates of these visits ranged from March to
November 1997, two-thirds of them were completed in May. Before each visit, the ANHB
staffers coordinated with the various federal, state, and regional agency staff (remote
maintenance workers, public health service engineers, and rural business advisors) who
provide technical assistance to each community for water and sanitation management,
operations, and maintenance. Over two or three days, ANHB staff talked with community
personnel to understand community needs, assess options, and facilitate planning sessions to
prepare draft work plans (scope of work) and budgets.
Half the communities had completed work plans and budgets and signed O&M Pilot
Project Partnership Agreements with ANHB and were ready to start their projects by July 1,
1997. The remaining communities took a little longer to complete these tasks, with the last
project in the group starting November 1, 1997. Stebbins never completed a work plan or
partnership agreement and was dropped from the program in December 1997.
Under the terms of the partnership agreements, the communities were obligated to
submit quarterly reports of their activities. There was also extensive follow-up communication
and problem solving by telephone with ANHB. All but three of the communities received
second site visits from ANHB. Two ANHB staffers made these second visits, all of which
except two were between January and May 1998; the earliest visit was in November 1997 and
the last was in April 1999. Many of the communities experienced delays in implementing their
projects. In some cases, the scope of the project was revised part way through. Twelve of the
twenty communities were given extensions of one or more quarters. Four community projects
were extended into the fall of 1999 and are not yet closed out. One community was dropped
from the project. Fifteen communities completed their projects and were closed out. The
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project start and end dates, award amounts, percentage of awards actually claimed, and
community matches for the twenty Phase II communities are shown in Table 4.
This report focuses on the fifteen completed projects, plus Shishmaref, because,
although that project has been extended, Shishmaref has a very rich data record.












Chefornak 7/1/97 9/30/98 $15,915 100% $25,087
Deering 10/1/97 extending $34,700 75% $10,256
Galena 7/1/97 6/30/98 $12,000 100% $17,000
Kiana 7/1/97 9/30/98 $40,000 100% $54,064
Kongiganak 11/1/97 10/31/98 $40,000 100% $15,860
Koyukuk 8/1/97 7/31/98 $40,000 100% $20,080
Mekoryuk 9/1/97 11/30/98 $37,083 71% $17,221
Napaskiak 7/1/97 6/30/98 $40,000 100% $32,541
New Stuyahok 10/1/97 3/31/99 $40,000 100% $9,957
Noatak 7/1/97 6/30/98 $40,000 100% $81,411
Nondalton 7/1/97 12/31/98 $35,286 100% $30,575
Nunapitchuk 10/1/97 9/30/99 $40,000 100% $26,392
Shaktoolik 7/1/97 6/30/98 $39,968 100% $18,154
Shishmaref (2nd yr) 12/1/97 11/30/99 $20,000 25% $4,045
St. Michael 11/1/97 10/30/99 $38,044 68% $2,374
Stebbins - 12/12/97 $39,000 0% -
Tanacross 7/1/97 12/31/98 $28,475 100% $13,216
Tanana (2nd yr) 10/1/97 9/30/98 $20,000 100% $26,432
Unalakleet 7/1/97 12/31/98 $35,000 90% $31,571
Venetie 8/1/97 7/31/98 $37,271 25% -
TOTAL  $672,742 88%  $436,236
*Any non-federal services or funds the community used to manage, operate, and maintain the
sewer and water system during the project year. Documentation was supplied by each community.
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Chapter II.  Evaluation Methodology
Multiple Case Study Design
For the project evaluation, we are using a multiple case study research design. Case
study research is the preferred design for three reasons: (1) our primary research questions are
exploratory and explanatory (what, how, and why); (2) the phenomena we are studying are
complex and context dependent; and (3) we have many more variables of interest than we have
data points. We use similarities and systematic differences across case study communities to
strengthen the analytic conclusions we draw.
Research Questions
The ANHB program goals as set out in the initial grant proposal are to:
• protect the public health of rural Alaskans through effective water and sanitation facility
operation and maintenance
• protect government and community investments in sanitation facilities
• build community capacity for operating and maintaining sanitation facilities
• demonstrate the feasibility of reducing life-cycle costs through alternative technologies
The major themes for Phase II projects emphasizing utility management and public
education squarely address the third ANHB goal—building community capacity for operating
and maintaining sanitation facilities. The project themes indirectly serve the first two goals:
improved management and finances facilitate improved operations and maintenance—which in
turn protects public health and public investments. For all three goals, improving operations
and maintenance is the key outcome we’ll use to measure program success. As a secondary
measure of community capacity for O&M, we’ll also track improvements in financial
self-sufficiency.1
The two general research questions we address for all study communities are:
• Has the demonstration community, as a result of this program, improved its operations and
preventive maintenance?
• Has the demonstration community, as a result of this program, become more financially self-
sufficient in operating and maintaining its sanitation systems?
These general questions can be broken down into many subsidiary questions, as shown
in Table 5. We use all sixteen community project evaluations to address some larger research
questions, which are also detailed in Table 5:
• What interventions work to improve O&M?
• Can these models be extended to other rural communities throughout Alaska?
• Was the O&M pilot program successful in moving us toward long-term solutions to rural
O&M problems?
                                                
1 To address the fourth goal, ISER is preparing, as a separate study, an analysis of the life-cycle costs of flush-haul
technology.
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TABLE 5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
I. Within-case research questions:
    A.  Has the demonstration community, as a result of this program, improved its operations and
preventive maintenance?
1.  Did the O&M indicators change over the period?
a.  Was there a change in operator hours or in the percentage of scheduled
maintenance activities completed?
b.  Was there a change in policies, procedures, or planning in support of O&M?
c.  Was there a change in operator skills or resources for O&M tasks?
d.  Was there a change in operator attitude or perceptions of community support?
e.  Was there a change in the physical condition of the facilities?
2.  Did the program interventions cause the change?
3.  What about the interventions caused the change: the intervention itself, or the
implementation process?
4.  How did the implementation work?
5.  What were the important factors in determining program outcomes: key individuals?
community organization? community composition or social structures? outside assistance
or catalyst?  program philosophy of community empowerment?
    B.  Has the demonstration community, as a result of this program, become more financially
self-sufficient in operating and maintaining its water and sewer systems?
1.  Did the financial indicators change over the period?
a.  Have collections increased?
b.  Have savings been realized?
c.  Was there a change in utility finance policies, procedures or planning?
d.  Was there a change in financial management skills or resources?
2.  Did the program interventions cause the change?
3.  What about the interventions caused the change: the intervention itself, or the
implementation process?
4.  How did the implementation work?
5.  What were the important factors in determining program outcomes?
    C.  How might these changes improve public health, protect facility investments and build
community capacity?
II. Cross-case research questions
    A. What interventions work to improve O&M?
1.  Were the successful interventions successful across different types of communities?
    B. Does community initiative and control contribute to program success?
    C. Can these findings be generalized?
    D. Did the O&M pilot program move us in the direction of long-term solutions to rural
O&M problems?
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Data Collection
Successful operation and maintenance of rural sanitation facilities can be broken into
four dimensions: operations, management, finance, and community support (Figure 1). Each of
these in turn can be broken into components. To measure improvements in O&M, we
attempted to collect information on each of the ten O&M program components shown in
Figure 1. We augmented these O&M indicators with information on community context and
project implementation to address the other research questions in Table 5. We collected
qualitative and quantitative information from the 16 communities and secondary sources:
• Background information: community profile, demographics, history and description of water
and sanitation systems
• Project implementation: plan, objectives, and description of implementation process,
problems, and successes
• Operations: operator training, turnover, hours and pay, O&M activities, O&M plans and
procedures, resources and equipment
• Management: manager training, hours and pay, administrative tools and systems, planning
and analysis activities
• Finance: fees, billings, collections, expenses, record keeping, reporting
• Community support: formal policies, community education, and community attitudes
Facilities and Supplies Operator Manager Administrative Tools and Systems










FIGURE 1. PROGRAM COMPONENTS FOR OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF RURAL SANITATION
Table 6 identifies the sources for each of the data clusters in Figure 1. The sources are
described further below.
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Community Survey and Community Records
We tried to collect about the same data for Phase II communities as we had for Phase I,
but we used a different strategy. In Phase I we relied on the communities to voluntarily
complete the community survey and attach the requested documents as part of their agreement
with ANHB. But submittal of the surveys and supporting information (such as fee collections
or policy information) was spotty.  For Phase II, we negotiated separate data collection
contracts directly between ISER and the project communities. We also asked the communities
to play a greater role in the evaluation, assessing for themselves whether the O&M indicators
had changed and why, and writing, reviewing, correcting and updating portions of the report.
The community survey is a 12-page structured questionnaire (Appendix A). It requests
information as of May 1997—and in some cases, two years of history—about operations,
maintenance, finances, utility operators, utility managers, and community education about the
local water and sanitation systems. Several questions ask the contractor to attach supporting
documents, such as copies of ordinances and policies, fee schedules, maintenance records, or
job descriptions. This information serves as a reference point for assessing the outcomes of the
pilot projects. Even with structured payments for data the communities supplied, we received
only twelve pre- and eight post-project surveys.
Data Gap Interviews
Because we had too few responses to our community survey from July through
September 1999 to complete the analysis, we conducted telephone interviews of project
managers in each community, soliciting missing data for key indicators essential to the
evaluation design. A copy of the survey appears in Appendix B.
Other Community Information
Part B of the data collection contract specifies seven writing and editing tasks, asking
the contractors to correct and update the community profile information and to describe the
water and sanitation systems, operations and maintenance activities, finances, community
attitudes toward service, and the project application process. Part C requests quarterly reports
documenting current system finances from July 1997 through June 1999. Part D asks the
contractors to assess, after completion of the project, the changes resulting from the project.
Part E asks the contractors to update the information provided in Part B as of March 1999. Part
F asks the contractors to update the information provided in the community survey as of May
1999 and to update their assessments of project effects under Part D. These dates refer to
projects that started July 1, 1997; we adjusted dates for projects that started later.
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Field Notes, Phone Logs, and Project Documents
The ANHB staff members who visited each of the communities are key informants in
this study. Their field notes are a primary source of information describing project
implementation in each community. With the research questions in mind, the staffers were
asked to record their observations and interpretations during their trips to negotiate the
partnership agreements, as well as during follow-up contacts throughout the project. Phone
logs project staff kept are valuable sources of information on project implementation. Project
documents such as the community interest form, the project application, the cooperative
agreement, and quarterly reports are also primary data sources.
Operator Interviews
Another primary means of data collection was a structured telephone interview of
utility operators in each community. We interviewed 26 operators in May 1997 and conducted
repeat interviews with each of them or their successors in June and July 1999. The questions
were about work hours, duties, availability of tools, materials and parts, operator attitudes, and
support from the community council, supervisor, and residents. A copy of the survey
instrument appears in Appendix C.
State Program Records
The Rural Utility Business Advisor (RUBA) program in the Alaska Department of
Community and Economic Development offers technical assistance and training for rural
communities about the business and financial administration of their utilities. The RUBA
advisors are assessing the budgeting, record keeping, and accounting practices in most of the
pilot communities, as well as the proficiency of community personnel. Their reports
supplement our data on the financial operations of communities and their utilities and in
particular the unique training needs of each community.  In the spring of 1999, the RUBA
program began a survey of utility operations, finances, accounting systems, management
organization, personnel and policies. We included in our data ten surveys from project
communities.
The Department of Community and Economic Development (DCED) also maintains an
online Alaska Community Database. It includes descriptions of communities and their
facilities, data from the U.S. census, and information from other government sources on
community economies, employment, schools, businesses, municipal finances, rural grants, and
ANCSA land status.
DCED collects revenue and expenditure data from the certified financial statements of
municipalities throughout the state. For each project community that is incorporated, we have
up to ten years of financial data on enterprise (utility) funds. Our analysis of this data will be
limited, however, due to the lack of detail by utility and inconsistencies in reporting.
We also use records of community water sampling that the Drinking Water Program in
the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation’s Division of Environmental Health
keeps. The Rural Issues Program of the Department of Environmental Conservation performed
an environmental assessment in three of the project communities. The reports provide detailed
observations on drinking water, wastewater, solid waste, hazardous materials, pollution
prevention, and fuel tank farms.
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Remote Maintenance Worker Assessments
We asked the eight remote maintenance workers (RMW) and IHS operations and
maintenance program specialists who work with the selected communities to complete short
assessments of facility condition. Because of the poor response rate, we revised our data
collection design to include focus groups for the RMWs and RUBAs.
Remote Maintenance Worker and Rural Utility Business Advisor Focus Groups
Responding to comments from the Coordinating Committee on the Phase I report,2  and
because of the low response rate noted above, we revised the evaluation design to include
overall data collection from remote maintenance workers (RMWs) and rural business utility
advisors (RUBAs). Nine RMWs attended a dinner meeting in May 1999; twelve RUBAs
participated in a teleconference discussion in June 1999.  Following a short written
questionnaire about perceived changes in indicators for both project and control communities,
facilitators asked participants to explain their observations and opinions. Copies of the
questionnaires and discussion guides, along with a list of participants, appear in Appendix D.
Overall Evaluation Interviews
In addition to the above efforts to document project outcomes, we conducted telephone
interviews with all community project managers about their experiences with the ANHB grant
program. Questions addressed whether and how the program helped them with long-term
O&M and how ANHB and other agencies could better serve them. The interviews were
scheduled after project close-out, and ranged from July 1999 through September 1999. A copy
of the overall evaluation questionnaire appears in Appendix E.
                                                
2 Evaluation of the Alaska Native Health Board Sanitation Facility Operation and Maintenance Program: Final
Report on Phase I Projects, ISER, April 1999.
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Community profile x x x
Water and sanitation systems x x
Project implementation
Plan and objectives x
Implementation process x x x x
Operations
Operator job x x x x x x
O & M plans and activities x x x x
Management
Manager job x x
Planning activities x x x x
Finance








Community attitudes x x x
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Data Analysis
We compiled the hard-copy data collected for each community in three-ring binders.
The analyst read through the record, key entering data elements into an Access database. The
completed database could then be queried to report data organized by any key variable,
including community name, demographics, source of data, indicator type, activity type, or
research question.
The RMW and RUBA focus groups were recorded, transcribed, corrected, and read into
a Nudist database. The database was then coded by community, source, question, and theme.
The completed database could then be queried to report data organized by any key variables,
including community name, source, indicator, theme, or question. The written RUBA and
RMW questionnaires were tallied in an Excel spreadsheet.
The overall evaluation interviews were key entered verbatim into an Excel spreadsheet,
allowing the responses to be readily compared and summarized by question across community.
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Chapter III.  Project Activities and Outcomes
Table 7 summarizes the types of activities undertaken in these sixteen communities.
Based on their experience from Phase I, ANHB staff encouraged all the communities to make
partnership team building an activity in their work plans. The popularity of utility management
and customer education activities reflects the priorities of the Coordinating Committee in
selecting projects for funding, as well as an increasing perception in communities and agencies
that these strategies pay off.
Project Data
Table 8 reports changes in outcome indicators for all communities; the unshaded cells
are changes attributed to the pilot projects. Tanana and Tanacross undertook and—if we
consider that the intent of the Tanana work plan was to maintain, not increase the first three
O&M indicators—achieved the broadest range of improvements. Shishmaref and Shaktoolik
also improved on all relevant indicators, with Napaskiak and Nondalton close behind.  All
communities that implemented projects showed improvements.3  This table does not indicate
the magnitude, scope, or impact of the improvements. Such discussions are included in the
individual community descriptions in Volume II.
Improvements in community involvement and support for the utility were the most
common project outcomes (10). Improvement in utility management—that is, effective
governance and oversight—was a frequent goal among the projects (13), but it was less often
achieved (8, or 62 percent). Eight communities were able to improve their financial
management. The smaller number of projects (7) aimed at improving the condition of facilities
had the highest success rate: 100 percent.
The O&M projects are part of a broader effort, involving other people and resources, to
improve water and sanitation in these communities. We would expect project and non-project
activities to support each other; indeed, that is the premise of the partnership approach. If we
look broadly at all the changes in outcome indicators, whether project-related or not, we find
that two thirds or more of the communities showed improvements in operator skills, condition
of the facilities, financial management, and support for the utility.
                                                
3 Koyukuk made improvements but failed to sustain them after the project ended. Venetie never implemented its
project.
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Chefornak X X X X X 5
Galena X X X 3
Kiana X X X X X X 6
Kongiganak X X X X X X X X 8
Koyukuk X X X X X X X 7
Mekoryuk X X X X X X X X 8
Napaskiak X X X X X X X 7
New Stuyahok X X X X X X 6
Noatak X X X X X 5
Nondalton X X X X X X X 7
Shaktoolik X X X X X 5
Shishmaref X X X X X X 6
Tanacross X X X X X X X X X 9
Tanana X X X X X X X X 8
Unalakleet X X X X X X 6
Venetie O O O O O O 0
Count 12 8 5 4 2 13 6 2 2 10 8 6 3 3 1 5 6
Legend X Activity in work plan and implemented, at least in part
O Activity in work plan but not implemented
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Chefornak ! - ~ " ~ " - - " " " "
Galena ~ - ~ ! ~ ~ - - - ~ " "
Kiana ~ ! ~ ! ~ " - " " " ~ ~
Kongiganak ! ! " " ~ ~ " " " " " "
Koyukuk ! ! ~ ~ ! ! ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~
Mekoryuk " " " " ~ " ! ~ ! ~ ~ "
Napaskiak ! " " " " " " - - " - "
New Stuyahok ~ ~ ~ " - " - " ~ ~ ~ "
Noatak ! ! ~ ~ ~ ! " " " " ~ "
Nondalton ~ ~ - " " " " - " ~ ~ "
Shaktoolik ~ - ~ ! ~ " " " " " " "
Shishmaref " " " " " " ~ " " " " ~
Tanacross ~ ~ " " " " - " " " " "
Tanana ~ ~ ~ " " " ! " " " " "
Unalakleet " " ~ " " " " ! " ~ " "
Venetie ~ ~ ~ " 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Legend: " Improvement
~ About the same
! Decline
0 Project not implemented
- Unable to determine
These outcomes are outside the scope of the O&M project workplan
Note: Detailed information explaining project outcomes is provided in the text and tables in Volume II.
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RMW and RUBA Observations
Table 9 shows the assessments, for some communities, of the RMWs and the RUBAs
about changes in O&M and financial management indicators from June 1997 to May 1999.
Unfortunately, this information was not available for all project communities. In the focus
group discussions, the RMWs and RUBAs elaborated on their assessments. The biggest change
during the project period, noted by RUBAs both in their questionnaires and their narrative
comments in the focus group, was in management indicators. This reflects the emphasis the
Coordinating Committee placed on selecting communities that sought to improve their
management. While the RMWs noted improvements in some O&M indicators, comparison
communities without ANHB grants showed greater improvements in O&M indicators over the
same period.
On the whole, there was little net change in operators’ hours or percentage of scheduled
maintenance completed in project communities. The RMWs noted few specific changes in
policy or procedures in any community in support of operations and maintenance. From their
discussions, it seems that policies or procedures that had been in place before the project were
implemented or enforced. In many project communities, a portion of ANHB funding was used
to buy critical spare parts that were used to improve the condition of the facilities, thus
increasing the availability of parts—as noted in the RMW responses to the questionnaire.
However, the RMWs focus group discussion pointed out that no communities increased and
maintained their inventories of critical spare parts; when the next breakdown occurs, they will
have to wait for vital parts to be ordered and shipped. RMW focus group participants noted
some improvements in operators’ skills.
Responses to the RUBA questionnaires showed that six project communities increased
collection of utility fees. These were Nunapitchuk, Kongiganak, Tanana, Tanacross,
Shishmaref and Shaktoolik.  For the few communities (Tanana, Shaktoolik, and Shishmaref)
discussed in the focus group, RUBAs attributed the increase primarily to the hiring of persons
who were competent, skilled, or aggressive in collections. Also, a variety of administrative and
operations and maintenance activities potentially strengthen and support future collections.
Tanacross set fees, developed a collection policy, and implemented user agreements. Koyukuk
set up a billing and collection system for households; it had previously been collecting only
from the school. Nondalton retrofitted its water system with shut-off values, so it could turn
households’ water off as a part of collection enforcement. And the RUBAs noted increases in
customer knowledge about the need to improve collections and to have users’ fees. All these
changes were the result of O&M pilot projects.
It appears that communities with increased revenues used these funds for current utility
activities. They did not set savings aside for parts, emergencies, or capital expenses. They used
any additional dollars to pay for current utility management, maintenance and operation.
Local management skills, systems, and resources also appeared to improve. RUBA staff
noted that improvements in financial policies, procedures, and planning were often tied to the
hiring of new, competent persons in utility management positions—for example, tribal
administrator, bookkeeper, city administrator, or city clerk—particularly in communities with
clear shared ideas of what they wanted to achieve.  Examples of these include Tanacross's
bookkeeper, Shishmaref's clerk, Noatak's utility manager and Shaktoolik’s clerk.
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TABLE 9. CHANGES IN INDICATORS REPORTED BY RMWS AND RUBAS, BY PROJECT COMMUNITY


























Cherfornak - - - - - - - - -
Deering ~ ! ! ! ! - - - -
Galena ~ ~ ! ~ " - - - -
Kiana ~ ! ! ~ ~ - - - -
Kongiganak - - - - - - - - -
Koyukuk ! ! ~ ! ! " " " "
Mekoryuk - - - - - ~ ~ ! ~
Napaskiak ! " " " ~ - - - -
New
Stuyahok
~ ~ " " " ~ - ~ ~
Noatak ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - -
Nondalton ~ ~ " " ~ ~ ! - -
Nunapitchuk ~ ~ " ~ " " - " "
Saint
Michael
" ~ " ~ ~ ! ! ! !
Shaktoolik ~ " ! ~ ~ " " " "
Shishmaref " " " " " " ~ " ~
Stebbins ~ ~ ! - ~ - - - -
Tanacross ~ ~ " " " " " " "
Tanana ~ ~ ~ " " " " " "
Unalakleet " " " " " ~ ~ " ~
Venetie ! ~ " " ~ - - - -
Legend: !indicator declined " indicator improved ~ indicator stayed about the same  - don’t know or information not available
                           These outcome indicators are outside the scope of the project workplan.
Phase II Final Report
21
The ANHB funds in some project communities paid for upgrading computers and
financial software. With assistance from the RUBA program, these communities improved
their skills and resources. Unalakleet is a good example, as are Nunapitchuk and Nulato.
RMWs and RUBAs participating in the focus groups highlighted the following
improvements they saw as a result of the O&M pilot program.
• Tanana used ANHB funds as seed money for establishing an independent utility, while it
focused Village Safe Water funds on capital improvements to the facilities. ANHB funds
paid for administrative overhead while the system was under repair and Tanana was unable
to collect user fees. It expected to collect more revenue from customers, through increased
collections, once the repairs were complete. This increased revenue would also provide
support for operators and managers previously funded by the ANHB grant.
• Shishmaref saw ANHB funds as a catalyst for improving morale, community support, and
teamwork (among the RUBA, RMW, city administrator, clerk, operator, and regional
sanitarian). This improved relationship made the community and the city administration
realize that if they worked together with these utility funds, things would improve in the
community. More teamwork also helped Shishmaref acquire a large capital grant for
improving its water and sewer system. These capital improvements represent some long-term
change and benefits. In this case, good management supported by a little money (the ANHB
grant) was leveraged for a lot more money and long-term improvements.
• Nunapitchuk, Unalakleet , and Nulato bought additional computer equipment and financial
software so they could prepare better and more timely utility management reports. These
communities already had the basis of a good system. New equipment and some training
allowed them to focus on particular items that improve utility management.
• Nondalton used ANHB funds to retrofit its system with shut-off values, so it could enforce
collection policies in a fair and equitable manner.
• Tanacross used ANHB funds to order and install critical parts for its water system and
washeteria—which in turn gave the community a chance to increase service (laundry) and
generate more revenue (user fees from the washeteria).
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Chapter IV.  Cross-Case Questions
In this section we address the cross-case research questions originally posed in Table 5:
• What interventions work to improve O&M?
• Do community initiative and control contribute to program success?
• Can these findings be generalized?
• Did the O&M pilot program move us toward long-term solutions to rural utility
O&M problems?
Tables 8 and 9 provide a little information about which projects worked, but for several
reasons it is very crude information. Both tables indicate the direction of change in key
indicators, but not the magnitude, scope, or implications of change.
The outcome indicators in Table 8 summarize our reading of the data record before and
after the pilot project and our understanding of project activities and effects. Still, a tabulation
across indicators shows more about the types of activities undertaken than about the degree to
which those activities were successful. A close reading of the narrative record for each
community (Volume II) provides much more insight about which projects worked and why.
The data in Table 9 are assessments by people with first-hand knowledge about some—
but not all—of the communities. Furthermore, in some cases the current RUBAs or RMWs
may not have been in a good position to observe the situation two years ago and to make robust
comparisons with the present. Their assessments may to some degree represent the
community’s current level of performance, rather than the net change in performance over
time. Also, these changes can’t be clearly linked to project activities.
Our data differ from the RUBA and RMW assessments, because we used multiple data
sources, including community interviews and project records in 1997 and 1999, and because
our data set is substantially complete for all 16 communities examined in this report.
How Did Project Success Vary Among the Communities?
Most Broadly Successful
Measured by the broad program goals of building long-term community capacity for
effective O&M, the four most successful projects were in Shaktoolik, Tanana, Unalakleet, and
Shishmaref. What these communities have in common is leadership, commitment, and a broad
base of support.
Shaktoolik had a broad base of leadership and skills to draw on, from a forward-looking
city council and capable staff to a strong partnership with RUBA. A city council member
drafted a well-thought-out work plan before ANHB staff visited. The mayor, city council, city
clerk, utility clerk, utility operator, RUBA, and LGS all worked together to tackle the issues
one by one. ANHB grant funds were critical to hiring the utility clerk, performing sewer
maintenance, and conducting house-to-house customer education. Everyone was committed to
the improvements. Individual skills varied, but the chain didn’t break: even with turnover in
key positions—the mayor, utility clerk, and operator of ten years—project implementation
slowed but did not falter.
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In Tanana, water and sewer systems were the number one priority. In 1996 the city and
tribe were already working to consolidate water and sewer operations in one non-profit
corporation, with the goal of constructing a new piped system. A number of outside agencies
have supported and invested in that effort, including RUBA, VSW, TCC, RMW, as well as
VSW-funded engineering and business consultants. The ANHB grant supported the utility
manager position during this transition period. The manager was very capable and a key
component of their project’s success. Unfortunately, with delays in bringing the new system on
line, revenues have not increased enough to fund the position without the grant, even though
collections are at 100 percent. It is unclear how well the utility will fare without a manager.
The best turnaround story is Shishmaref. Shishmaref began the project with poor
management and administrative capacity and massive debt. But because of the community’s
focused desire to fully implement the planned flush-haul system and the willingness of
managers and administrators to work through internal problems and with outside agencies, the
community made major gains in its capacity to operate and manage the utility. There were
many challenges and strained relations along the way, but as these were addressed one by one
synergy developed between the council, city staff, and outside agencies. As the council
steadily improved its understanding of utility management, it was able to make effective
decisions and provide leadership and oversight for the staff. As the new clerk worked with
RUBA to learn bookkeeping and financial management skills, and as she gradually resolved
the financial problems she had inherited, she was able to provide more and better information
to the council and respond more quickly to the operator when he wanted to order parts. The
ANHB grant—which provided money for parts—and the focused support of the new RMW
greatly improved the operator’s productivity and morale. While many challenges remain,
including technical problems with the flush-haul system, very high O&M costs, and high staff
turnover, it appears that the gains in administrative capacity are enduring.
Unalakleet is the largest of the project communities and, as the headquarters for the
Bering Straits School District, has a comparatively well-paid and well-educated work force.
This community has the most sophisticated management and accounting system in the group,
as well as the oldest and largest piped water and sewer system. Unalakleet does not need
management coaching—just money to maintain its aging system. Hence, it has a close working
relationship with VSW, but not with RUBA. Unalakleet’s broad pool of skills and leadership
and high level of organizational development enabled the community to complete its project
smoothly, despite turnover in every city position associated with the project.
Least Successful
The five least successful projects were in Koyukuk, Kiana, New Stuyahok, Venetie, and
Stebbins. What the first four have in common is lack of consistent leadership and follow
through. The fifth, Stebbins, did not even follow up on ANHB’s award of grant money. The
administrator was never able to get the council to work with her on a work plan and
partnership agreement. After a site visit, many phone calls and several letters from ANHB,
Stebbins was dropped from the program in December 1997.
Venetie illustrates lack of leadership commitment to improving water and sanitation.
After six months of intermittent contacts by ANHB staff, the village council did hire a utility
manager. But there was no supervision of the manager and no evidence in the record of any
work activities undertaken. Following tribal elections, the priorities of the First Chief changed.
ANHB offered to revise the work plan accordingly, but Venetie did not follow through.
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New Stuyahok’s plan to computerize and systematize billing and collections failed,
apparently due to staff no-shows for training, followed by unresolved scheduling conflicts
between RUBA visits and the fishing season. The community’s modest effort at customer
education was not enough to raise collection rates significantly above the historic trend of 10
to 25 percent. In developing the work plan, community leaders passed up the idea of installing
curb stops to enable them to enforce collections. The city administrator seemed to be more
interested in the ANHB grant as a revenue source than as an opportunity to solve tough
problems. The city is at a very low level of administrative development and does not take
advantage of the development assistance outside agencies offer.
Koyukuk’s basic problems were turnover, turmoil, and leaders leaving the village.
Because the city could not demonstrate the required financial and management capacity, the
planned flush-haul system was postponed. Without a flush-haul system, the work plan
activities no longer made sense. While the record is very thin, it appears that the ANHB funds
may have been spent on washeteria operations and billing and collections for electricity.
Kiana also suffered from isolated leadership and high turnover. The community had
four administrators over two and a half years, plus turnover in the city clerk and both operator
positions during the project period. The utility manager was laid off when the grant money ran
out. There also appeared to be a lack of support and involvement from the council. The city
administrator and city clerk attended utility management training just prior to the ANHB grant,
and used their new learning to draft a model work plan. But the work plan was “by the book,”
not an organic outgrowth of local leaders’ understanding and priorities. Much of the work plan
was never completed, due in part to lack of consistency in supervision and support from either
the council or the administrator. When the utility manager did propose a collections incentive
found successful in other villages, the council did not approve her recommendation.
Limited Success
Chefornak, Kongiganak, and Mekoryuk had limited success with the project. With help
from RUBA, Mekoryuk made gains in financial management capacity but could not sustain
them. High turnover in the city clerk position and the end of the grant-funded city
administrator position undermined local efforts.
Kongiganak and Chefornak are similar to Koyukuk in that their work plans focused on
building administrative capacity for new systems—but when the new systems were delayed,
the work plan tasks no longer fit. Between turnover in key positions, slow evolution of
circumstances, and ANHB’s failure to talk to community leaders about the changes and to
encourage them to re-assess their priorities, Kongiganak’s work plan was never revised. The
project nevertheless did provide operator training, management training, improved accounting,
improved collections, and customer education about the old system. Chefornak started at a
very low level of administrative capacity and made solid gains in developing an accounting
system and in management training and organization. The largest gains did not come from the
ANHB project per se, but from the transfer of water and sewer operations from the city to the
tribe, which was able to provide stronger leadership and support for the utility.
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Successful but Less Broad
Like the first group we discussed, the final group of projects—at Nondalton, Noatak,
Napaskiak, Galena, and Tanacross—were all solidly successful and showed strong leadership.
But the implications of their success were narrower in some respects.
Galena is a regional center with good administrative capacity—including a city GIS
database. The community hosts an innovative boarding school and Internet-based distance
education school as well as an Air Force base. Galena’s city leaders knew exactly what they
wanted to do with the ANHB grant: they conducted a customer survey, rate study, and
engineering study—which they then used to leverage construction grants.
 Nondalton developed a well-focused project and executed it largely by itself. Repairing
leaks and installing curb stops enabled Nondalton to save money in operations, enforce
collections, and shut off water to homes while occupants were away, preventing freezeups.
The Napaskiak Tribal Council provided consistent leadership, planning, and follow-
through to craft innovative, village-appropriate solutions.  It consolidated water and sewer
operations from the city, purchased and operated a sewage haul unit, and supported it with
gaming revenues.
In Tanacross, effective leadership and commitment to improving water and sewer were
more concentrated in the tribal administrator. The administrator, who wrote the grant
application, had a strong working relationship with outside agencies, a good maintenance
supervisor, and a very capable bookkeeper. However, tensions between the administrator and
the council led to his departure some months after the project ended. It is unclear whether
Tanacross’ momentum for improving its water and sewer systems will be sustained.
Noatak is an example of a well-run utility that for the most part did a good job on its
O&M project activities, but suffered a major financial setback due to a pump failure and the
extraordinary expense of the improvised operations while the pump was being repaired. To
cover these costs, the community spent down its reserves, which in turn created a cash flow
and budget problem, and eventually a reduction in operator hours. Had the ANHB project
occurred a year earlier, Noatak might have had a spare pump in inventory and saved thousands
of dollars. But if it had not had the grant at all, it would have been in worse financial straits,
further compromising utility O&M. This breakdown illustrates how thin the margin is for
many rural utilities: how vulnerable they are to one problem precipitating a chain of problems.
In summary, community commitment to improving water and sewer systems and
supporting those systems with local revenues needs to be broad based. Strong leadership is not
enough without council support. The RUBA focus group drew the same conclusion: strong and
continuous community leadership is a key to success. As one focus group participant observed:
Both of these communities (Kiana and Shaktoolik) have RUBA people that were working
with them . . . . The only difference [was] . . . in one community the leadership was
willing to say yes, we're going to make these changes, yes we want to work, and in the
other community there was a lot of turnover in the leadership and the ones who were
there weren't really sure they wanted to make . . . changes [or] do anything.
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What Types of Interventions Worked?
Success Rates of Activities
To analyze which project activities worked, we look
at the outcome indicator data by activity. For each activity in
the work plans, and each relevant outcome indicator, we
calculate a success rate: the number of communities with
that activity that showed improvement in the indicator as a
result of the project, expressed as a percent of the total
communities with that activity.  (Strictly speaking, this
measure shows correlation rather than causality, since the
improvements might have resulted from other activities.)
This is a narrow definition of “success,” in that it does not
count cases where project activities prevented or mitigated a
decline in an indicator.
Figures 2 shows the success rates of the various types
of activities undertaken. Among O&M activities, the
strongest rates of improvement are the most tangible:
activities to maintain or improve the facilities did in fact
improve the condition of the facilities. Similarly, operator
training generally resulted in increased operator skills.4
(The exceptions were usually due to turnover).
Improvements in operator skills are also correlated
with operator support and O&M planning activities. None of
the project activities had any significant effect on operator
hours, on the percentage of scheduled maintenance activities co
of O&M plans and procedures. While purchasing parts and supp
have had small net effect on the available inventory of parts and
used and not restocked—see discussion in RMW focus group), 
activities are strongly correlated with net gains in parts and supp
improvement activities also have a strong effect on lowering op
The rate of collections is a key measure of success on th
this measure, hiring a utility manager or clerk was the most succ
activities focused on utility ordinances, procedures, and plannin
broadly successful, showing strong correlation with improveme
utility governance, and ordinances, policies and procedures. Est
committees and fostering cooperation between the city and tribe
rates, particularly with respect to community involvement and s
management training did not, by itself, appear to effect much ch
equipment, financial management, and billing and collections ac
successful at improving utility accounting than at improving col
activities strongly improved community involvement and suppo
                                                
4  About half of those trained passed their certification exams.…I think the stronger
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Differences With and Without Specific Activities
We can evaluate the effectiveness of project activities another way. We can compare
improvements between communities that undertook specific activities and those that did not.
For this comparison, we count all improvements, whether project related or not, and deduct
any declines. We then divide by the number of communities to calculate a net improvement
rate. The difference in rates between communities with and without specific activities can be
directly compared. Figure 3 shows the results.
This measure reinforces the earlier findings that facility maintenance and improvement
activities make a significant difference in condition of the facilities, cost efficiency, and
available parts and supplies; that funding operator training does improve operator skills; and
that operator support and O&M planning correlate with increases in operator skills and in the
condition of the facilities. The news is that operator training is strongly correlated with
improvements in O&M planning as well. More dramatic yet are the significant effects of
operator support and O&M planning on operator hours, scheduled maintenance, the stock of
parts and supplies, and the condition of the facilities.
This comparative measure supported the earlier finding that hiring a utility manager or
clerk increased collections. But it did not support the earlier findings about improvements in
financial management, utility management, and utility policies and planning with the hiring of
a utility manager. The difference in net improvements between communities with and without
utility managers or clerks were not significant.
We did find that the positive effects of utility boards, committees, and city-tribe
cooperation on utility management, ordinances, procedures and planning were robust. A new
insight from this comparison was that communities with these activities also improved their
collections much more often than communities that did not.
Utility management training has a very strong effect on collections and a positive effect
on utility management. Communities with financial management or billing and collections
activities or that aim to upgrade their office equipment actually fared worse in collections and
financial management than communities without these activities. This perverse result is
probably the result of selection bias: the communities that had more trouble with financial
management and billings and collections to begin with were more likely to target these
activities, and were less likely to succeed. Management planning and the development of
ordinances and procedures had a positive effect on collections and on the institutional
framework of policies and procedures but no significant effect on community involvement.
 Table 10 summarizes the comparisons from the bar graphs and indicates whether the
differences are significant. Unsurprisingly, communities that undertook O&M activities had
better O&M outcomes than those that did not. The pattern is more mixed, however, for
management activities: communities that undertook financial management or billing and
collections activities, or that upgraded their office equipment, showed less improvement in
collections and financial management than communities without these activities. This finding
is also likely selection bias: communities with good financial management and computer
systems were less likely to target these activities for the O&M project—and more likely to
have other resources to make improvements.
But Figures 2 and 3 are quite limited in what they can tell us. A close reading of the
narrative record in Volume II yields much more insight about what worked and why.
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TABLE 10. SUMMARY OF OUTCOME COMPARISONS WITH AND WITHOUT ACTIVITY
Activity Outcome Indicator














   Parts & Supplies ~ ~ ""
   Training (Operator) " "" "" ~
   Maintenance and Improvements "" "" "" ""
   Operator Support,  O&M Planning and Records "" "" ~ "" "" ""












   Utility Manager/Clerk " ~ ~ ~
   Boards, Committees or City/Tribe Cooperation "" " " " "
Utility Mgmt. Training "" ~ " ~
Mgmt. Systems & Resources
   Financial Management ! !
   Billings & Collections & Revenue Enhancement ! "
   Office Equipment ~ !
   Planning, Ordinances & Procedures " "" "" ~
Customer Education
   Re: Utility Cost and Fees " "
   Re: User O&M ~ ~
Legend: "" Much more improvement than communities without the activity
" Some improvement relative to communities without the activity
~ About the same or insufficient data to distinguish
! Less improvement than communities without the activity
Indicator not directly related to activity
(See Appendix F for supporting data; see the glossary for a description of each indicator and each activity.)
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Partnership
Most of the work plans included a partnership activity, typically including the operator,
clerk, manager, council; various outside agency staff such as the RMW, RUBA, LGS, VSW, or
ANTHC engineers; and sometimes consultants. In most cases these relationships were already
established and working in the community, but the project gave everyone a task to work on
together and strengthened their communication and collaboration.
As the earlier discussion of leadership made clear, effective internal partnership is
critical to improving O&M. In both project and non-project communities that the RUBAs and
RMWs described as “good,” community support and teamwork were there.
The importance of outside agency involvement varied across project communities. In
some communities, active involvement of outside agencies was a critical factor in their
success. For example, the RUBA in Shaktoolik, Tanacross, and Tanana; the RMW in
Tanacross and Unalakleet; and the ANHB in Shishmaref, Tanana, Tanacross, and New
Stuyahok.  In other places, (including Galena, Napaskiak, and Noatak) community personnel
were quite self-sufficient, only calling on outside agencies—if at all— for narrow purposes.
In yet other communities, no amount of help from the RUBA and RMW made a
difference. In Stebbins, Venetie, and New Stuyahok this was because there was no community
follow-through, and in Kiana and Koyukuk because the training and assistance the
communities received was eroded by turnover.
Having ANHB as an impartial outside counselor helped some communities (including
New Stuyahok and Shishmaref) sort out and think clearly about the issues. Non-judgmental
support on whatever the community chose helped develop community capacity. While in the
end New Stuyahok saw no tangible results, it was the coaching and encouragement of ANHB
staff that inspired the city administrator to contact RUBA at all. The big difference between
New Stuyahok and Venetie was community readiness to use the ANHB help.
The variation in the role of outside agencies resulted from several differences among
communities, including a given community’s existing level of administrative capacity; the
nature of its project, particularly whether it focused on maintenance (RMW) or management
(RUBA) issues; and the community’s attitude toward outside agencies. It also depended on the
quality of the relationships among the individuals. Relationships are central in village culture.
Developing relationships takes time and requires a wider range of interaction and
understanding than just getting the task at hand done. It is clear in the record that some agency
staff people have more skill than others in cultivating good working relations with community
personnel. The amount of time someone from an outside agency spends in the communities
makes a difference: day trips are not as effective as overnight or multi-day trips.
Overall, it’s clear that a conscious effort toward building partnerships does help
improve utility O&M and management. While communities do not always want or need
agency assistance, it is an instrumental resource for community leaders who are ready to make
changes and welcome outside help. Improved communication and coordination between
agencies serving a community also helps local leaders focus and coordinate their efforts.
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Utility Management Structure
This was a major theme for Phase II projects, encompassing three types of activities:
city-tribe cooperation; establishing a utility board; and hiring a utility manager or clerk.
City-tribe cooperation played a role in improving water and sewer management in four
communities, though it was explicitly part of the work plan in only two.
In Tanana, the city and the tribal government operated separate water systems;
establishing unified management was VSW’s condition for planning and construction of a new
system. Given the history of antagonism between the city and the tribe, this was a tall order.
But since improved water and sewer systems were a priority for each, and they couldn’t agree
which one of them should manage the utility, they eventually agreed to set up a non-profit
utility with equal representation from each. The ANHB grant supported the new organization
during the transition, funding training for the new board as well as hiring and training a utility
manager. The first annual meeting had a large turnout—about 100 people—and allowed for a
useful information exchange among the board, consultant, contractor, and customers. It was
such a success that it not only established the new organization as viable, but also reinforced
the cooperative trend between the city and tribe. All the elements of commitment, leadership,
broad support, and effective internal and external partnership were assembled in Tanana.
Napaskiak also divided utility management between the city and the tribe: the city
operated solid waste and honey-bucket haul; the tribe operated the washeteria and watering
points; and they jointly maintained the water plant. The community was in the process of
shifting more governance responsibilities from the city to the tribe;5 there apparently was
internal agreement that responsibility for water and sewer should be consolidated too. The
ANHB project was designed to facilitate this transition. The record supports a finding that the
tribe is forward-thinking and growing in administrative capacity, and that it did improve
management, operations and maintenance in the water and sewer utility.
In the past, the City of Chefornak had difficulty paying its taxes and managing its
accounts. That was one reason the community decided to transfer responsibility for water and
sewer from the city to the tribe. Responsibility for the ANHB project went with the transfer.
Though it was not formally part of the work plan, the transfer was key to improving financial
management of the utility. The tribe established a utility board and transferred the utility clerk
position to report to it. The new board was instrumental in instituting new fees and gaining
community understanding and support for them. Cooperation and support between the board,
city, tribe, and outside agencies continues.
In Galena, the city and the tribe negotiated a memorandum of understanding creating
the Galena Waste Management Steering Committee. Although solid waste management and
the committee are outside the scope of the O&M pilot project, it does provide some support to
ongoing efforts to improve water and sewer O&M in Galena.
In summary, city-tribe cooperation speaks to the larger issues of internal partnership,
community support, and effective leadership that are essential to improving water and sewer
management and O&M.
                                                
5  Although it was not indicated in the record for this community, this may be part of the larger trend of declining
state resources to assist cities and increasing federal resources to assist and empower tribes.
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Utility Board. Every organization needs a governing body that sets policy—a locus for
authority and accountability. When these functions rest with a city or tribal council, utility
management and oversight is sometimes lost among the myriad of city or tribal governance
responsibilities. Establishing an active utility board is a strategy for developing focus,
commitment, and expertise in the governing body, as well as for broadening community
support. The strategy clearly worked in Tanana. It worked in part because it had to: water and
sewer improvements were a priority, and neither the city nor the tribe provided a viable
alternative. As the governing body for an independent nonprofit utility, the Too’gha Board has
full responsibility and authority. It also received extensive training and transitional support
from outside agencies.
In Chefornak and Noatak, the utility boards were subsidiary to the tribal councils. The
Chefornak board got off to a slow start and suffered from poor attendance, but picked up
momentum after it began paying members $20 to attend board meetings. Board members came
to understand the importance of paying for utilities and voted to increase fees for water and
honey-bucket haul. In Noatak, payments to board members did not produce consistent
attendance. The board was disbanded for lack of funds as well as lack of activity.
Utility Manager or Clerk. When the chief executive officer of the utility is also the
tribal or city administrator—or the chief or mayor—again he or she has myriad responsibilities
and limited time. Hiring a utility manager is a strategy for developing focus and expertise in
utility administration and increasing the time and planning devoted to it. This proved to be
highly effective, but too expensive for a small utility. Here again, Too’gha is the leading
example. The utility manager hired under the ANHB grant developed a great deal of utility
management expertise and his leadership was instrumental in developing effective
administrative systems and good relations between the operators, board, customers, consultants
and outside agencies. After the grant ran out, however, even with a 100 percent collection rate,
utility revenues could not consistently support this position.
Similarly, Kiana used project funds to hire a utility manager who proved to be very
effective at improving billing and collections, communications, oversight and planning for the
utility. But when the grant ran out she was laid off.
Tanacross realized early on that it would not be able to support the utility manager
position described in the work plan, and instead divided the responsibilities between the
existing tribal administrator and the maintenance supervisor.
Mekoryuk used ANHB funds to pay part of the salary for a new city administrator
whose duties included construction and project management, utility management, and
customer education for the new flush-haul system. Initially he was very effective in these roles,
but over time he became so busy with city affairs he could not complete all the utility
management work.
There is no clear distinction between a utility clerk and a manager: there is a continuum
of responsibilities that can be assumed under either job title. The utility clerk hired in
Shaktoolik took on a broad range of responsibilities. She was instrumental in improving
financial planning and management, record keeping, purchasing, billing and collections, and
incentives for timely payment. She also supported a rate study that led to fee increases,
customer education, and reporting to the council. The happy ending is that she increased
collections from 40 to 90 percent—enough to pay for her position after the grant ran out.
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While the utility clerk in Chefornak was not funded by the ANHB grant, she played a
similar pivotal role in improving financial management there.
Koyukuk hired a “utility manager” whose primary responsibility was attending to the
washeteria. While she did get some training from RUBA on using a computer to record data on
washeteria operations, whatever capacity improvement this might represent was lost through
turnover—twice in ten months. Venetie hired a utility manager, but there is no evidence in the
record of any activity.
In sum, utilities that have the focused attention and expertise of a utility manager or
clerk are way ahead of utilities that do not. In the focus group, the RUBAs and RMWs
commented that a utility manager or clerk was key in communicating with the community
leadership, coordinating training opportunities for the operators, and purchasing the spare
parts. The unresolved problem is how to pay salaries for utility managers.
Revenue Enhancement
Here we include activities to improve billing and collections, raise rates, or develop
other revenue sources. While only five communities specifically listed this as an activity in
their work plans, fourteen communities attempted to increase revenues and eleven succeeded.
Shaktoolik is the top success story. Before the ANHB project, only about 40 percent of
the customers were paying their bills. By the end of the project, the collection rate had
increased to approximately 90 percent. At the request of the city council, the RUBA staff (with
the assistance of the utility clerk and the water and sewer operator) developed a rate study for
Shaktoolik. After listening to public comment, the city council increased rates for homeowners
from $50 to $60 per month and commercial rates from $55 to $70 per month. The council also
passed a new budget and a Code of Ordinances, which included utility ordinances.
Besides following the established utility shut-off policies, the rate study described
several ways to improve collections. Those included offering discounts to customers who paid
12 months in advance; holding a raffle for customers who paid on time, with a prize of a free
month of utility service; and taking delinquent customers to small claims court or taking away
their Permanent Fund dividends.
The utility clerk initially attempted to encourage yearly pre-payment, offering a
discount. However, most people did not have the necessary cash to pre-pay utility bills. With
the approval of the city council, the utility clerk developed a monthly drawing. To enter the
drawing, customers had to be current with utility payments (i.e., no outstanding money owed
the water and sewer utility). The prize was one month's free utility. In the first month (June
1998), 19 people participated. By November, approximately 30 people participated. This led to
a dramatic increase in utility revenues in a village with an estimated 46 homeowner accounts.
Nondalton had a three-pronged plan to increase collections: an improved billing
system; customer education; and curb stops to discontinue service for nonpayment. The city
hired a part-time staff person to install the new billing software and begin operations. It then
sent residents a letter explaining the new billing system, the importance of making timely
payments, and the penalties for non-payment.
Before the O&M project, Nondalton’s collections for the utility were estimated at 30
percent. The city did not want to enforce payment with disconnects because it would be
inequitable: one portion of the village had water service lines with shut-off valves, while others
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did not have shut-off valves. During the initial installation of valves in the fall of 1997,
collections increased as people anticipated the city's ability to shut off service for lack of
payment. However, as it became obvious the city would not install all the shut-off valves that
fall, collections went down again. Compounding the collection problem was the fishing
disaster. The water and sewer collections from households decreased three years in a row, from
$23,804 in FY97 to $14,506 in FY99. By the time of the closeout interview, however, the city
had used the shut-off valves twice and collections improved immediately.
Billing and collections were a major focus in Kiana’s work plan. The RUBA helped the
utility manager set up a new computer and develop billing spreadsheets. The utility manager
used these spreadsheets to send out utility bills and found they worked well. The RUBA
reported that collections increased. The utility manager also proposed a raffle like the one in
Shaktoolik for customers who paid on time; the city council did not adopt it. The utility
manager was laid off when the grant ran out. If the current city administrator leaves, it is
unclear whether the improved billings and collections can be sustained.
In Tanana, Too'gha improved management and fee collection at the laundromat. From
FY 97 to FY 98, laundromat revenues increased from $40,362 to $55,001—a 36 percent
increase, well in excess of RUBA's optimistic predictions. A major reason was that improved
facility maintenance made it more serviceable and increased use.
A 1996 utility management assessment for Shishmaref found, in part, that washeteria
rates were too low to cover costs; that there were problems with collections; and that some
accounts were being billed improperly or not at all.
Though there is no evidence in the record that rates increased, Shishmaref did collect
more revenue over the course of the project. Credit goes both to the sustained efforts of the city
clerk and RUBA to improve billing, collections, and financial management overall and to the
operator and the RMW working together to improve washeteria maintenance and service. The
ANHB grant was instrumental in several ways, providing critical funds, third-party counseling,
and a longer, two-year time frame for the project. (See the full discussion in Volume II.)
In Napaskiak, during the consolidation of operations and services, the tribe monitored
its costs of operating the transferred facilities. From this experience it developed an estimated
total cost for operating, maintaining and managing the water and sewer systems for one year.
Once the tribe collected this information, it then determined a share—estimated at 40
percent—of community gaming revenue to be set aside for this purpose. By the end of the
project, the tribe was fully supporting operation and maintenance of water and sewer utilities
with gaming revenues.
Chefornak used ANHB grant funds to buy a computer for billing and collections. The
billing and accounting system was not set up, however, until the new FTH system went in,
sometime after the pilot project ended. The RUBA and a VSW engineer helped the utility
manager set it up. The larger change during the project period was the transfer of water and
sewer management from the city to the tribe. The tribe established a utility board, which voted
to raise rates for water and honey-bucket haul. The record does not have information on
whether the new rates cover the cost of service or on how much was actually collected. The
tribe is willing to subsidize water and sewer costs with revenues from bingo and other sources.
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In Noatak, collections increased primarily because the staff was willing to enforce the
utility collections policy. Also, the community used the ANHB grant to purchase a new
computer, decreasing the time needed to print utility bills and giving the utility manager more
time to talk with customers.
In Tanacross, the tribe increased washeteria fees and collections. Even though
collections did increase, they started from a very low base and will need to increase
substantially more once the new sewer system is in operation. In the spring of 1999, the tribal
council adopted a full set of ordinances, including water and sewer utility rates, user
agreements, and provisions for terminating service.
In Kongiganak, the idea of a raffle for paid-up customers was a by-product of utility
management training. This raffle and customer education carried out by the youth sanitation
committee—through fundraising activities and a door-to-door survey—appear to have
increased collections.
At the time it applied for the ANHB grant, New Stuyahok kept billing and collection
records on paper and did not send out monthly water and sewer bills to its customers. Before
the O&M project started, PHS provided the city with a computer and the support services of a
consultant; training was never completed. In May 1998, RUBA staff visited the village to work
with the city administrator to develop a computer method for sending out water and sewer
bills; this training was never completed. At the end of the O&M project, the city was still not
using the computer billing method.
On several occasions documented in the record, New Stuyahok’s city administrator
noted the need for an education effort to help customers understand why they needed to pay
their water and sewer bills. At a community meeting, the administrator presented information
on the costs of water testing and water treatment chemicals. After the project ended, the city
ran CB radio announcements saying that the city offices were open and that people were
encouraged to come in and pay. While the city administrator claimed some positive results
from his efforts, the record is inconclusive on their long-term effects.
During the project period, the city administrator followed the customary practice of
door-to-door visits to collect water and sewer utility payments. Since the door-to-door visits
occurred about the time disaster relief funding and Permanent Fund dividend checks arrived,
he was able to collect some of the outstanding water and sewer bills. Water and sewer revenues
increased from $9,026 for FY98 to $19,942 for the first seven months in FY99. There is little
evidence, however, that future collection rates will be any different from the historical pattern
of 10 to 25 percent.
Washeteria revenues in Koyukuk improved—although very slightly and from a low
base rate—due to efforts of RUBA and the utility manager hired with O&M project funds.  The
RUBA focus group and questionnaire note that Koyukuk had major setbacks when leaders left,
but is now consolidating under new leadership:
. . . the [new] council is taking a hard line on utility collections, particularly electricity,
largely because of working on the PCE reports with [RUBA]. The council recently voted
to turn over $10,000 of delinquent electric accounts to an outside collection agency. Also,
collection efforts within the city administration have been improved and standardized.
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Overall, what worked to increase revenues? Again, consistent, committed leadership
was the key. Where this was present, these strategies worked to increase utility revenues:
• Computerized monthly billing and accounting
• Raffles to reward paid-up customers
• Credible enforcement of collections with shut-offs
• Rate studies and fee increases
• Public education and discussion of the need to pay for utilities and what the
money is used for
• Improved washeteria maintenance and service
• Allocation of gaming revenues to help pay for utilities
• Grants to support utility manager or clerk positions
• RUBA coaching and training on financial management
Preparing for a  New System
Another theme that ran through several Phase II projects was doing it right from the
start: helping communities develop administrative systems in preparation for their new water
and sewer facilities. The ANHB grant was seed money to get them started. Tanana is the
foremost example. Grant funding supported the utility manager and subsidized the operators
during the transition from city and tribal operations to the nonprofit Too’gha and the
preparation for the new piped system. During this period local leaders developed ordinances,
an accounting system, personnel policies, and, with VSW funding, a business plan.
Unfortunately, construction of the piped system will not be completed for several years, so
service and therefore collections have not started. Although the new laundromat is generating a
revenue surplus, it is not enough to cover the operations of Too’gha.
Like Too’gha’s work plan, Tanacross’s plan called for hiring a utility manager who
would develop systems and management skills to serve the new sewer system long after the
O&M grant ended. When construction was delayed, the community decided not to hire new
personnel, but continued with the planned activities—although at a slower pace. It focused on
educating customers on the new system and the need for paying user fees; on drafting
ordinances; and on training operators and managers. The tribal administrator and vice president
got OIT-certified to help the village score higher for planning and construction grants.
Tanacross’s water and sewer ordinances are a good model. The tribal administrator
coordinated with the LGS, the RUBA, and a consulting firm to ensure that the draft ordinances
contained the necessary sections for utility management. During the drafting of the ordinances
there were several village meetings, usually attended by five to seven people. The tribal
council adopted temporary ordinances as they were developed and the full set of ordinances in
the spring of 1999.
The Tanacross O&M project improved the existing utility system while the community
prepared for a new system. The boiler replacement will reduce maintenance costs for several
years. The parts inventory should reduce the time staff spend identifying parts when ordering
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replacements. The water and sewer ordinances provide users a foundation for understanding
their rights and responsibilities with the new sewer system. Because the sewer project has been
built with local labor, the village increased the number of locals who know the system. The
construction crew may be a source of personnel for the utility in the future.
Napaskiak took a different approach. Instead of focusing on management for a major
new system, it focused on incremental improvements to existing operations. Specifically, the
community invested its ANHB grant in a sewage pumper vehicle that will serve the immediate
purpose of pumping and transporting sewage from honey-bucket collection bins. When the city
gets flush-haul units, the pumper will be used to service them. The tribal council monitored
operating costs for the water and sewer systems and successfully budgeted gaming revenues to
pay for them. It also invested in operator training and developed a regular maintenance
schedule. The administrator communicated in person and by letter with customers, instructing
them to avoid putting debris that could damage the equipment into the haul bins.
Shishmaref is an example where the city, contractors, agencies, and ANHB
collaborated from the beginning to help the village prepare for a new flush haul system. ANHB
played an important role by providing the city with funds to maintain staff while it worked to
improve maintenance and collections in the existing system. Activities included setting up
separate accounts for the utility; monitoring costs and revenues; reviewing rates; maintaining
the water plant and washeteria and ordering parts; training and supporting operators; and
educating the community on use of the facilities. The city made large strides in improving
O&M and financial management, but it was plagued by problems with the flush-haul system.
Mekoryuk already had a flush-haul system underway and needed to develop
administrative and financial capacity to manage it. It used the ANHB grant to buy time for the
city administrator to work on construction project management and utility management; to buy
office equipment; to train the administrator, clerk, and operators; and to educate customers.
While these efforts succeeded in the short run, even with a high collection rate the revenues
were all consumed by O&M, with none left to sustain the administrator after the grant ran out.
Chefornak planned to use its ANHB grant to develop computerized billing and
accounting for its new flush-haul system. When construction was delayed, completing the
billing and accounting system and putting it into operation were also deferred to 1999.
Kongiganak planned to use its ANHB grant for community education, a user manual,
and operator and management training for the new piped water and sewer system. When
construction was delayed, the user manual and community education activities focused on the
honey-bucket haul utility instead.
The work plan for Kiana included a new computer, billing and collections system, and
customer education—apparently intended to prepare the community for a flush-haul system. In
practice, the plan was implemented for the washeteria operations; construction of the flush-
haul system was not begun until 1999.
In sum, the project communities had limited success with the strategy of preparing to
manage new systems,because either: (1) construction delays put the O&M project out of sync
with the new water and sewer system, so project activities were less meaningful and grant
funds not well used; or (2) the O&M and management requirements for the new systems
proved too expensive for the communities to sustain from utility revenues.
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Maintenance on Old Systems
Nondalton’s water system, built in 1971, is one of the oldest in rural Alaska. Before the
O&M project began the water plant treated approximately 72,000 gallons per day. Based on
village population and the per capita national average water consumption, a city this size
should have been pumping between 25,000 and 30,000 gallons per day. The city believed its
excess consumption was mainly due to leaks in the system and wasteful use by customers.
Using the ANHB grant, the city replaced 20 old copper service lines and conducted customer
education. Water use dropped 30 percent, down to 51,000 gallons per day. Over several years,
this reduction will translate into reduced O&M costs through reduced demand for treatment
chemicals, less wear and tear on pumps, and longer use of current storage capacity before the
city needs to expand the system to accommodate population growth. Installation of curb stops
also gave the city the ability to enforce shut-off for nonpayment.
Unalakleet also has an old water system with high O&M costs. Even with utility
maintenance as a priority, the city has had difficulty generating revenue to pay for more than
the basic operational costs. The O&M project provided funds for needed maintenance,
including repairs to standby power generators and sewer lift-station pumps. The city also
bought spare pumps and motors for the water plant or lift stations. The critical spare parts and
operational back-up generator are expected to save money in future repairs.
Unalakleet and Galena both have problems with non-standardized parts. In Unalakleet,
the lift stations all have different pumps because they were built in different phases. This
increases operating costs: it is too difficult and expensive to keep four different types of pumps
in inventory, especially when some of the models are no longer available. The RMW report
recommends standardization. Turnover in PHS engineers has also contributed to the problem.
In Shaktoolik, the operator and laborers reconditioned five leach pits and re-insulated
two septic tanks and leach pits. This maintenance will increase the life of the leach fields.
Galena is pursuing another strategy to improve efficiency: new alternative technology
septic systems that permit on-site disposal in semi-permafrost soils.
In Noatak, a pump and control panel at the lift station went out. A replacement pump
was not available, and it took three months to get the pump sent out, rebuilt, returned and
reinstalled. Meanwhile the city had to hire extra labor and the pumper vehicle to move the
sewage from the inoperable lift station to the operating lift station. All in all, the community
incurred about $17,000 in unplanned expenses. It had to cut the budget and reduce operator
hours, thereby performing less O&M. Also, a construction project ruptured the waste heat line,
so Noatak has had to pay for heat rather than use waste heat. The O&M project partly paid for
this emergency repair work. Without the O&M project, the utility would have been worse off.
Kiana has a 1971 vintage water system. The lines freeze easily and the maintenance
costs are high. The city has historically fixed water and sewer line freeze-ups that by ordinance
are the homeowners’ responsibility. Because the system is old, this maintenance requires a
substantial amount of the operator's time and drains the city water and sewer budget. The
current city administrator is starting to enforce the city ordinances, though it is too early to tell
if the city council and the customers are willing to change the historic pattern.
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In sum, there may be significant opportunities to improve the cost efficiency of old
systems through system maintenance and repairs. Also, enforcing homeowner responsibilities
can lead customers to take better care of their plumbing and service lines, as well as shift some
of the expense off the utility.
Customer Education and Community Involvement
Customer education is intended to encourage proper use and maintenance of the
facilities— thereby lowering O&M costs—and timely bill payment.
There is also a broader concept of community involvement that aims to increase two-
way communication about water and sewer utilities. This kind of involvement is intended to
elicit community feedback for improving service, satisfaction, and facility design; to enlarge
the community of knowledgeable and engaged people for utility oversight and governance; to
expand the skilled labor pool for operators, alternates, or assistants; and generally to promote a
sense of “ownership.” For example, Tanacross’s use of local labor in construction was
intended to increase local knowledge about the new facility and about operating and
maintaining it. Too’gha’s board, open planning meetings, and well-organized annual meetings
engaged community members in utility oversight and governance. Kongiganak’s customer
survey elicited opinions about current water and honey-bucket services and informed the
community about plans for and implications of a new piped system.
Education About Utility Costs and Fees
In planning for the new sewer system in Tanacross, the tribal administrator and agency
staff recognized the need to educate customers about the new system and the need for paying
user fees. The tribal council organized a public meeting to present information on user fees,
user agreements and contracts, and the additional costs of the new system.  Council members
described the enforcement of fees and acknowledged the burden that it may cause for some
people. The 12 to 15 residents who attended generally agreed that it was good to set up user
fees. Because of construction delays, we have no evidence in the record whether these efforts
at community education paid off in higher collection rates.
New Stuyahok focused on improving collections through customer education, customer
billing, and personal requests for payments of overdue bills. The work plan called for a letter
or handout informing water and sewer customers about the importance of maintaining the
water and sewer facilities; reporting the costs of maintenance and of fluoride and chlorine; and
discussing why the water samples must comply with government regulations. Documented
activities consisted of one community meeting; CB radio announcements that the city offices
were open and encouraging people to come in and pay their water and sewer bills; and the city
administrator going door to door collecting water bills. During his talks with community
members, he noticed the need to develop a flier or information sheet describing the utility costs
to help them understand why they need to pay for water. He also expected some backlash when
the customers received monthly bills for the new water and sewer system. The city
administrator reported that a small percentage of people have begun to recognize that the water
and sewer utility is theirs and they need to take care of it.
Kongiganak has also been preparing for a new piped system. Its work plan called on the
traditional council to provide information to community members and utility users—through
monthly meetings, radio announcements, house-to-house visits, and fliers—about costs
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associated with operating and maintaining the new utility. Because construction was delayed,
however, the youth sanitation committee developed information on the honey-bucket haul
utility instead. It developed a user’s manual outlining procedures and guidelines for using the
facilities. The brevity of the manual made it easy to distribute, post, and remember.
The O&M grant project advisor and two committee members also conducted a
household survey, during which they explained the plan to upgrade to household flush toilets
and answered residents’ questions about the current system. This helped residents understand
what was going on and their role in making the system successful in the future.
The youth sanitation committee also briefed the traditional council and organized
fundraisers (to pay its own expenses), which helped raise awareness about utility operations.
These communities have subsistence economies. Most residents have limited cash
income and little or no experience paying for local services. Collections and customer attitudes
toward utility fees are the biggest challenges rural utilities face. While the record shows few
short-term effects of education efforts on collections, there is some evidence of changing
awareness and attitudes that may have long-term benefits. More opportunities for community
leaders to get together in their regions or statewide to share their experiences and discuss what
kinds of strategies have worked would be helpful.
Education to help Reduce Operation and Maintenance Costs
Noatak is the best example of customer education to reduce maintenance costs. The
utility manager and the operator developed a laminated one-page flier reminding homeowners
about what not to flush down the toilet and what to do to ensure pipes didn’t freeze. The flier
also pointed out that it is the homeowner’s responsibility to fix all leaks inside the house and
listed whom to call if they needed help. After distributing the flier, the operators noticed they
got fewer calls for assistance and had fewer problems with the lift station. The utility manager
found customers were more cooperative. The utility manager and operator discovered the flier
made their jobs easier.
Nondalton wanted to reduce water consumption. The community prepared and sent
fliers to customers explaining how they could reduce water use. The fliers described how to fix
leaking faucets, the importance of turning off faucets when not in use, and the amount of water
wasted by continuously running toilets. A city staff person went door-to-door explaining to
customers the effects of letting the water run continuously. The city hosted a small community
demonstration on how to save water by re-setting toilet tanks to lower levels, using low-flow
shower nozzles, and taking other steps to reduce water use. The city also provided sessions at
the school to teach kids the cumulative effects of leaving water on unnecessarily.
A key benefit of the education program was getting residents to tell the utility when
they were going to be out of town for more than a few days. Once the shut-off valves were
installed, the utility could turn off water in individual homes, reducing the risk of frozen lines
if the heat went out. Homeowners benefited because they were not billed for water during such
periods. Since starting this policy, the city has had fewer freeze-ups.
Another incentive for homeowners to notify the utility when they are out of town is the
city policy that households must pay for repairs to their service lines. The city also beefed up
collections with a letter explaining its new billing system, the importance of making timely
payments, and the penalties for non-payment. Project outcomes include an estimated 30
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percent reduction in water consumption, because leaking water service lines were repaired and
customers conserved more water.
Napaskiak’s tribal administrator noticed plastic bags and other debris in the honey-
bucket bins—debris that could damage the new pumper equipment. He sent letters to the
households that used these bins, asking them not to dispose of debris in the bins. Other times
he called the householders directly, explaining the problems operators had with debris in the
bins. The resulting change in household behavior lowered O&M costs for honey-bucket haul.
Shaktoolik’s utility clerk and operator walked door-to-door to talk with customers
about the importance of heat tapes and keeping their house temperatures level. This effort
helped customers learn what they could do to reduce maintenance problems and utility costs.
In Shishmaref, one of the main tasks for the O&M project was preparing the city
administration and customers for the new flush-haul units. One goal was to make customers
more familiar with the new equipment in their homes and reduce the potential for maintenance
problems during the winter. The contractor who built the flush-haul system was reported to
have provided posters, placards, and pamphlets for the houses. Ongoing problems with the
units indicate that either the education efforts were unsuccessful, or that the problems
customers had with the system were beyond their capacity to deal with. In either case,
maintenance costs remain very high.
Mekoryuk’s VSW engineer provided training for homeowners, administrators, and
operators on the construction and maintenance of the flush-tank haul system. He also covered
environmental impacts, health concerns, and potential solutions. The city administrator
reported being stopped on the street by residents asking who was responsible for maintaining
the flush-tank haul system. There were public meetings to discuss costs and responsibilities for
the system and to allow customers to describe their concerns about the project. Information
was also distributed through cable TV.
Koyukuk posted notices and signs on proper use of the washeteria. Utility use was
discussed during city council meetings.
In these communities, most residents have limited experience with household
plumbing. Many people don’t know what can and can’t be put down the toilet, the best ways to
prevent freeze-ups, or how to make simple repairs to their units. Basic information provided in
an easy to understand format—particularly information about the new technology now being
installed—goes a long way toward creating a smoother running, lower-cost system.
While the significance of the community education efforts varied widely across these
projects, there is no question that community education is a critical element in the effort to
lower maintenance costs and increase revenues for village water and sewer utilities.
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Chapter V.  Was the Pilot Program Effective?
Did the ANHB project make any significant difference in O&M performance in the
project communities, compared with other communities? We are looking at several statewide
data sources, but have completed our analysis of only one—major drinking water violations
(SNCs, or significant non-compliance) reported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
For this report, SNCs are used as an index of O&M performance.
Figure 4 compares major drinking water violations across project and non-project
communities before, during, and after the project period. The control communities are 12 that
applied for but did not receive ANHB demonstration grants. The super control communities
are all other Alaskan communities with populations between 100 and 1,000. SNCs are an
aggregate measure of major drinking water violations under the surface water treatment rule
and the total coliform rule. Once an SNC has been issued, a community must be free of
violations for two quarters before the SNC will be removed.
The figure shows that SNCs have been rising among both the project and the control
groups.6 SNCs for the project communities started out at a much faster rate and rose faster than
for the control group.7
FIGURE 4. SNC INDEX OF O&M PERFORMANCE FOR PROJECT AND
CONTROL COMMUNITIES
                                                
6 Neither EPA nor DEC has been able to explain this rising trend.
7 It is possible that the project communities have a higher rate because a larger proportion uses surface water and
they are therefore subject to the surface water treatment rule.
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Figure 5 compares the results of the RUBA and RMW questionnaires for project and
control communities. (The control communities is this case were other communities the RMWs
or RUBAs worked with, selected for their similarities to the project communities in
populations and utility technologies.) The bars represent the changes in indicators averaged
across communities. The Phase II project community data derives from Table 9.
FIGURE 5. CHANGES IN INDICATORS REPORTED BY RMWS AND RUBAS,
PROJECT AND CONTROL COMMUNITIES
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While Phase II project communities on average consistently did worse than control
communities in improving O&M indicators, and consistently did better in improving financial
management indicators,8 none of the differences are statistically significant. (See Appendix F.)
The most robust difference appears to be the percentage of maintenance activities
completed, for which a smaller proportion of project communities had increases and a larger
proportion had decreases than among control communities. In responding to questions about
maintenance activities, RMWs saw an increase more often among control communities as
compared with project communities. In the project communities, RMWs noted a decrease in
scheduled maintenance among project communities compared to control. One reason for this
may have been that project communities were more likely to work on upgrading facilities (i.e.,
adding shut-off values) or handling larger emergency problems (i.e., the rebuilding of a pump)
and hence scheduled maintenance decreased. Control communities continued with and
increased their maintenance activities. Similar proportions of control and project communities
kept about the same level of scheduled maintenance activities.
Observations about the Program
The RUBA discussion in the focus group was more eloquent than the data. The
innovation of the ANHB program as a whole is best summarized by Mike Black:
What this project did was lay out some money that didn't have to build a building, you
don't have to go start a new community hall, you can use this for operations and you
can use it for management and we'd like to see long-term result from it. I think that is
very different than what kind of money they're [the communities] seeing now  . . . .
This said we want it focused on utility management, utility issues, operating and
management, but you have a lot of leeway as to how you want to propose to spend it.
ANHB was focusing on the hard-to-serve communities. . . . The benefit of ANHB
grants  . . . was that it would help focus the councils and the mayors and the
leaderships in general vision or purpose on utility issues, because it was there. In
other words, if somebody told the council there was $20,000 there that could deal
with this issue, which is utility management related or utility related, they were a hell
of a lot quicker to grab a hold and spend that time to get focused on that issue, than
they would have been by us going in solely and saying you need to deal with utility
management.
It's very difficult to predict where you have proper so-called management, and who's
going to be successful. In hindsight, it's very easy to see what went into it, but when
you're looking into the community for the first time that's [hard. ANHB’s approach
was] very general work plans, leaving most of the initiative up to the communities. In
the communities that were successful, I think that was a positive approach because it
cut down on the restrictions in the sense that the bureaucracy and paperwork
necessary to get the grant and use the grant were reduced. So it probably had … a
more positive impact in those communities than the more restrictive grant conditions
that are more typical.
                                                
8 There is potential here for observer bias. The Phase II projects focuses on management activities. The RUBAs
were more likely and the RMWs less likely to be familiar with and sympathetic to the project..
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Another RUBA, Irene Catalone, echoed some of those perceptions.
The key there was flexibility . . . . They were willing to work with the communities.
Another innovation that occurred was the emphasis on partnership. The most
successful projects and those that are expected to have long-term effects are
communities with strong partnership teams. To me, the biggest thing that contributed
most to whatever small successes may have led to larger successes, was the different
agencies working together. Where we had the greatest success, [we] would be
working closest together.
The RUBAs also had some suggestions about how to improve the grant program:
• When evaluating the applications, assess the level of community involvement and support.
Consider who actually wrote the grant: was it a community person, consultant, or agency
representative? Does the application reflect community priorities? Are community leaders
committed?
• Assess community cooperation and partnerships; require partnership in the project work plan
and implementation such that they have to play an active role and meet certain criteria.
• Review and comment on persons hired to work on the grant to ensure the best-qualified
person is hired. Reduce the influence of family relationships.
• Encourage involvement of the school; build an awareness of what city government is and
what utility management is, and build a bridge from schools to job opportunities in city
office, tribal office or corporation office. If young people want to stay in the communities,
there are opportunities, because communities need qualified personnel to run these systems.
Like the RUBAs, the RMWs thought that the ANHB grant program was valuable, but
had reservations about the lack of conditions on the grants. Their suggestions for tightening up
the program included:
• Increase RMW input in the application and selection process for ANHB projects.
• Set prerequisites, such as that somebody in the community has taken the utility management
class and is involved with managing the ANHB project in the community.
• Require a preventive maintenance plan to be submitted before the first grant payment.
• Require the city administrator or tribal administrator and financial person to attend utility
management training as part of the grant award.
• Require that anyone who attends training paid for by ANHB grant funds return to the
community and apply that training.
ISER Observations
We raise the issue of ANHB oversight. While the philosophy of the program is to
empower communities, there also needs to be an element of accountability, oversight, and
feedback for effective learning. Grantees must be accountable to ANHB not only for funds
spent but also for the underlying purposes of the grant. ANHB needs to provide continuing
oversight and feedback to help grantees (if they need such help) to stay focused on their project
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goals and to re-assess those goals and adapt project activities in the light of new experiences
and changing circumstances.
While on the whole the projects and ANHB’s oversight relationships with the
communities were successful, it is worth reviewing experiences in a few of the less successful
communities to see what we can learn to make future programs even more effective.
New Stuyahok used its grant to pay the water and sewer operator and the clerk. While
there was some progress toward computerizing customer accounts (using that account data for
reference), the community did not achieve its number one goal of sending out monthly water
and sewer bills. This community is having a hard time making the transition from external
funding for local services—supplemented by periodic personal appeals to pay water and sewer
fees—to internal funding based on monthly paper billings and systematic collections9. While
the ANHB project was intended to help the community make this transition, its net effect was
to enable it to continue in the old mode a year longer and to reduce the monthly water and
sewer fee from $25 to $15 per month, using the fishing disaster as a rationale.
The first quarter report was submitted on time and reported reasonable progress on all
the work plan activities. ANHB’s second staff visit occurred April 1, 1998. The second quarter
report, completed May 1, 1998, is the first evidence in the record that the billing system was
falling behind schedule. For the third quarter, August 11, 1998, New Stuyahok reported it was
still working on all the tasks, but there was no apparent progress. ANHB sent the last $10,000
of the grant on August 28, 1998. This final check could have been withheld pending substantial
completion of the work plan—specifically, the task of monthly billings.
Koyukuk had a great deal of turnover and turmoil. The city administrator's position
turned over three times, and the utility manager position turned over twice. A previous city
administrator who was no longer in the village had written the application and work plan. The
budget was spread across operator wages, manager wages, training, office equipment, and parts
and supplies. The first quarter report showed very little activity, yet claimed $10,000 in
documented expenses. The second quarter report showed good progress. The third quarter
report was blank, but claimed $13,000 had been charged against the grant. Among all the
villages, Koyukuk’s phone logs indicate the least amount of work carried out. Apparently,
ANHB continued sending checks because the community submitted good financial
documentation. We also note in the record an improving trend in community leadership, albeit
not on work plan tasks. The RUBA focus group noted:
Koyukuk has gotten off to a slow start since many of the community leaders left their
positions in the past year to take jobs outside the community. The city now has an
active city council and strong mayoral voice . . . . the city council, ANTHC [and]
RUBA [are actively working together] regarding the coming flush haul pilot project.
[Regarding utility fee collection:]  At the present time Koyukuk has no water/sewer
distribution except for the school, which they are keeping current. Laundromat
revenues have increased marginally. However, the council is taking a hard line on
utility collections, particularly electricity, largely because of working on the PCE
reports with [RUBA].  The council recently voted to turn over $10,000 worth of
delinquent electric accounts to an outside collection agency. Also, collection efforts
                                                
9  Practical finances may become a problem, but that is not the threshold issue at this point.
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within the city administration have been improved and standardized. [They] recently
weathered a cash flow crunch in the laundromat, largely because of some unchecked
purchasing and payroll tax obligations. The purchasing is now back on track and the
council and administration are now monitoring all expenditures. The problem in
Koyukuk was that for a while the city attempted to run the laundromat as an
autonomous operation, all payroll and purchasing is now back under the purview of
the city. [RUBA has helped in improving management skills, systems and resources
by . . . assisting] with the PCE reports and accounting. The city has a ways to go but
the trend is definitely improving. [Regarding utility policies, planning and
procedures:] strong improvement in this area. Koyukuk has had problems with the
flush haul system from day one, largely as a result of community apathy. Now, the
community leaders are determined to go forward on the project and as a result a
great deal of planning is taking place. Examples: Working on an ordinance for the
sanitary landfill, completing house-to-house surveys for flush haul, planning on lands
disposal and clear title for the flush haul project. (RUBA focus group and
questionnaire)
Kongiganak’s plan was an undisguised jobs project. The first activity was a youth
sanitation council, for which members were paid a stipend. The application justified this,
saying “This would create more jobs for our community, thus keeping in step with welfare
reform.” The largest item in the budget was operator salary, 28 hours per week for a full year.
The grant also paid a part-time project advisor. The work plan included several activities
emphasizing preparation for the planned piped water and vacuum sewer system. The first
quarterly report noted that since the piped system had been delayed, some activities would
require a project extension. Had ANHB been tracking closely, it might have suggested
renegotiating the work plan, holding some of the funds over for another year. The first quarter,
Kongiganak received $10,000 and reported spending $3,000. During second and third quarters
it received $10,000 and spent $8,500 and $8,708 respectively. It is not clear in our (ISER)
record when and how the remaining grant funds were accounted for. There is also no evidence
that the parts inventory task was ever completed.
As it happened, ANHB could not keep up with all the Phase II communities.
Flexibility, adaptation, and relationships are ANHB’s hallmark with the pilot program; these
elements can be lost with large workloads. The staff can only work with and keep track of so
many villages.
Overall Interviews
The richest sources of information about the effects of the ANHB program overall are
interviews with the communities themselves. By the deadline for this report, we had completed
overall evaluation interviews with administrators in ten of the Phase II project communities.
Without exception, each of the ten communities felt that the Alaska Native Health Board
grants helped their communities make significant long-term improvements in sanitation
operations and maintenance. Furthermore, most felt that they would not have made the
improvements without assistance from ANHB. But even the communities that thought they
might have made the improvements anyway felt that ANHB’s financial help and other support
helped their projects move along a lot faster and more smoothly. The mayor of Nondalton
summed up the feeling of several when he stated, “We were aware of the problems before the
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grant, but we might not have had the money to do it as quickly. It was definitely a shot in the
arm, and reduced some of our costs to free up more money for O&M.”
When we asked “How did the Alaska Native Health
Board grant program help you?” community responses tended
to cluster around three main areas: money, staff support, and
technical assistance.
Money
Overall, administrators we interviewed saw financial
support for community projects as the most critical component
of the program—mainly because most of the villages are small
and unable to generate enough money for large-scale
community projects. In fact, all the administrators interviewed
said funding from any source was vitally important.
Several communities used some of the project funding
to purchase computers to help utility managers or
administrators modernize and update their water and sanitation
operations, organize material, keep track of parts, supplies, and
labor costs, and make contacts with people outside their
communities. Several communities are now keeping utility
payment records on computers and will even disconnect
customers who are delinquent or will require pre-payment for
those who are behind on their flush and haul payments.
A few communities were able to obtain computers or re-
locate old computers for operators—to make their O&M,
inventory, purchasing, and record-keeping tasks quicker, easier,
and more systematic. In some instances, they used ANHB funds
to secure training for those who would be using computers for
the first time. In contrast, a few village operators have
progressed to a level where they have created customized
computer programs that they can monitor daily for routine and
preventive maintenance. However, such computer expertise is
still a long way from being the norm.
Other villages used ANHB funds to purchase much needed
units that help prevent raw sewage spillage in the summer, or to re
equipment, pipes, copper lines, boilers, tools, and washing machin
Staff Support
The second most valuable component of the program was A
project communities. Community leaders acknowledged Joe Sarco
Ashton, and Tina Long at various times throughout the survey for 
They listened to people in the communities, helped them think thro
experiencing, and helped them make plans to correct those problem
Administrators were grateful that the ANHB staff worked t
particular needs of their communities. Indeed, a frequent praise of I think every community
should do a program
such as this because it
makes them start
thinking about what they
really need, and what
they need to do in the
future, what they need to





interview, July 13, 1999
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Grant) has probably
done more for this
community, the people,
and the awareness of the
importance of water and
sewer. The fact that (the
grant is) helping us into a
scenario to where we
can actually, physically
maybe be responsible for
our system, whereas we
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each of them had, at one time or another, come directly to the villages to try to understand the
conditions and circumstances that existed there. Another characteristic of the ANHB staff that
pleased administrators was that they encouraged the villages to determine their own courses.
They listened, visited the villages, offered suggestions about options and possibilities that
might be considered, and were available for ongoing consultation and support. Local leaders
were then free to consider all options and discuss them with the community at large.
The ANHB staff was also praised for the quality of its ongoing community support.
Most of this support was through frequent telephone contact, but in several cases local leaders
noted that when necessary ANHB staff “came out to the village personally, rather than just
talking on the phone.” In one instance, the city manager of Galena reported that Joe Sarcone
even accompanied him when he presented to DEC his case for installing 30 new septic tanks.
Technical Assistance
The ANHB staffers also helped in other ways. They helped communities make
operations and maintenance a priority by funding community door-to-door surveys and
projects to educate the community about issues like water use and the proper care of home
sanitation systems. They also helped communities develop comprehensive plans and establish
community ordinances to support water and sewer regulations. The ANHB staff also helped
solve ongoing computer technical problems, as well as helping village workers learn how to
use new computers and develop technical skills.
In many instances, they helped community leaders write grants to obtain money from
other funding sources. They encouraged villages to link up with other agencies that could help
them reach their goals. Those included agencies like RUBA, which went into villages to help
establish accounting and bookkeeping systems that enabled communities to better monitor and
manage their sanitation funds.
 “Couldn’t be better.”
When asked a question about “ways the ANHB program could have been better,”
community administrators had no suggestions. All of the respondents said that ANHB had
always been ready and willing to help and had always lived up to its agreements. All were
pleased with ANHB performance throughout the contracts and did not believe there was
anything that could have been done better. The tribal administrator in Napaskiak captured the
general tone of community responses when he stated, “They were real good with our grant.
They were real good. I just have one thing to say and that is, ‘Keep up the good work.’ Our
contact, Joe Sarcone, was real good. He came to the village two times and was very helpful.
ANHB opened up areas that were not available before, and helped us establish contacts
throughout the state, and told us of new funding opportunities. There is nothing they could
have done better.”
Even though respondents had no suggestions for improvements ANHB could make,
many used this question to make a plea for ongoing funding. These administrators expressed a
strong desire to continue to improve the quality of the water and sanitation in their villages.
Requests for funding here covered a wide range of possibilities, including needed equipment,
computer programs and training, continued operator training for certification, operations
support, and just “funding” in general.
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I think the ultimate and
the most important thing
for all agencies is that
they need to ‘Ask’ not
‘Tell.’ Let us (the village
staff) be part of solving
the problem instead of
feeling that we are a
sore and they need to
put a bandage on it. I
could expand on that
question till tomorrow
morning, but it boils
down to getting them to
ask us questions.
Because we are not all
engineers out here,
they rely on their
experts and spend
thousands of dollars to
do some things that
prove to be wrong
because they do not






All of the villages surveyed reported they were either “satisfied” or “very satisfied”
with the Alaska Native Health Board program in their communities. The combination of
ANHB funding tailored to the needs of each community and staff support that was personal,
caring, and educational rather than directive appears to have created programs that were both
immensely satisfying and productive in the view of all the community leaders.
Other Agencies
When administrators were asked what other programs
were valuable to them in improving their water and sanitation
operations and maintenance performance, it was evident that
there are many agencies working to improve and maintain water
and sewer systems in rural Alaska. Most frequently mentioned
by the communities surveyed thus far in the project were the
Remote Maintenance Workers (RMWs); Village Safe Water
(VSW); and Rural Utility Business Advisors (RUBAs). Other
agencies mentioned were the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), -
the Alaska Department of Community and Economic
Development (DCED), Federal Rural Development, and Cowater
Construction out of Ontario, Canada and Anchorage, Alaska.
In the final survey question of the overall evaluation
interviews, administrators were asked how regional, state, or
federal agencies could improve service to their respective
communities. Two responses were mentioned repeatedly and
with equal frequency and were directed to all levels of
government. Those two responses were:
• Improve agency communication with the villages. This
would apply to both disseminating information and
asking more questions instead of just giving directives.
Local leaders also considered it very important that
agency personnel travel periodically to villages to see
and understand what is happening there.
• Improve funding sources for all rural community water
and sewer projects.
A third frequent response, also closely related to the
request for increased funding, was that the government simplify
the grant application process to make it easier for communities to
apply to a variety of potential funding sources. Other suggestions for improved service to
villages included striving for coordination in processing applications and coming to the
villages to do yearly inspections.
The Unalakleet city manager had his finger on the pulse of much of what is happening
in rural Alaskan communities, particularly the widespread problem of generating sufficient
funds for rural sanitation operations and maintenance programs:
One of our biggest problems here is making the system pay for itself so that we can
get everything we need (to keep it operational).  It is a bare-bones operation, and
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most of the money (we collect) goes for salaries. We are really devoid of a preventive
maintenance program, and do not have a large stockpile of parts and supplies. If
there is any area that we need help on it is this one.
We have gotten really good service from the state, the feds, the Indian Health Service,
and the Alaska Native Health Board over all these years. All these agencies helped us
a great deal, but this didn’t happen by accident. Our leadership was good, and there
was a lot of foresight back in the 1950s and 1960s to plan for and get monies to put
this kind of a system in place with the help of these agencies. If other communities
would like to learn how we got this system, we would be glad to tell them how we got
it together.
Lessons Learned and Shared
Nearly all the administrators who took part in the ANHB project felt they had learned
things that could benefit other communities. For example, the mayor of Nondalton said that his
community “. . . learned more about the sanitation system and the new technologies. We also
learned about paying for the costs (of those technologies) and conserving water and those types
of things. Years ago we didn’t conserve water, and we didn’t know how to pay for these
services. We are learning.”
In Shaktoolik the mayor said “The accounting system and the collection system and the
ordinances, we learned it all. Computers also played a big part. We are now able to shut people
down when they don’t pay their bills. We have actually shut people down, and now they have
paid their old account up and also paid a $100 reconnect fee, and they said they wouldn’t get
behind again. These are the things we learned. We were very lenient in the past.”
The city administrator of Mekoryuk said he learned that his village needs a full-time
utility manager who is not also the city administrator. When he tried to do both jobs over the
last few years he discovered that the utility manager’s job took about 75 percent of his time.
But to keep the city running smoothly, he needed more time for the city administrator’s duties.
He also felt strongly that “our flush tank haul system seems to be the most viable option for
many Alaskan communities because of the lower cost to build, lower maintenance, lower user
cost, and the fact that many Alaskan villages have a permafrost problem.”
In a similar vein, the mayor of Galena felt that his community’s “look at the perkable
soil with intermittent permafrost was very worthwhile and could be good for other
communities with similar soils.”
The Chefornak water and sewer manager felt that his village learned that “it is better to
keep the environment clean. We are more aware of the environment.”
The Noatak utility manager said her village learned “it takes a lot of work and a lot of
people to get a grant.” She also believes that she learned several other things through the
course of the project, like how to make fliers to educate the community about issues of
concern. Through feedback from the community she also learned that her fliers were “really
helpful to people . . . making it easier for them to understand (what is expected of them).”
Napaskiak’s tribal administrator felt that the community’s involvement with the ANHB
project helped it to “develop a scope of work and a work plan that will be helpful in other
projects, now that we know how to develop it.”
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The tribal vice president in Tanacross felt that one of the most important things his
community learned was to use funding combined with community general fund money and
“hire local labor . . . . All the work was done with local labor, and that gets money into the
households in the community.” The general manager of Too’gha, the Tanana utility, felt that
he probably learned “thousands of things” through the course of the project. One of the things
he learned is that “it is important to have good communication.” Another is that “communities
should learn to reach out for other grant funding . . . . I’ve learned that it is difficult to run a
corporate program with no funding source.”
Other Issues
In the course of our evaluation of the Phase II projects, we identified some other themes
that have long-term public policy implications for water and sewer O&M in rural Alaska.
These issues do not as yet have clear answers, but we raise them for discussion and analysis.
Economies of Scale
Even the most capable communities and successful projects in the Phase III group are
stretched financially. Three kinds of costs are at issue: paying for management; paying for
large, non-routine maintenance projects; and paying for emergency repairs.
Management
 The costs of management are largely fixed. For a large utility with many customers,
this overhead is spread over a large revenue base. Unalakleet (population 803) is big enough to
afford staff that Shaktoolik (population 226) cannot. Communities with populations of about
500 appear to be large enough to afford a utility manager or dedicated clerk, depending on the
type of service and condition of the local economy. When the city or tribe operates the utility,
there may be some shared staff or management functions that offer some economy or some
subsidy in the form of free office space or revenue sharing.
But when the utility is independent, like Toog’ha in Tanana, the management costs are
an even larger financial burden. Toog’ha was only a success because outside grants subsidized
its excellent management; the washeteria could not support it. The Toog’ha business plan
developed by the consultant forecast seven years of deficit operations until the first group of
water and sewer customers are connected and begin paying fees. A small community or utility
does not have the finances to weather seven years of deficit operations. Tanana also has
seasonal cash flow problems, noted by the RUBA.
Capital Funds for Maintenance
 According to the RUBAs at the focus group, communities that increased their revenue
used these funds for activities related to utilities. Most communities have a long list of utility
needs such as meeting payroll and purchasing parts, tools, and supplies. They did not set aside
savings for future purchase of parts, emergency funds, or capital expenses. There is no
mechanism currently in place to fund large, non-routine maintenance projects like the system
improvements undertaken in Nondalton.
First-class and home-rule municipalities with stable revenues issue bonds to finance
these sorts of projects. But this mechanism is not available or practical for small communities.
They may compete for grant funds through ANTHC or VSW, but these sources are geared
more to larger capital construction projects for new systems. Either ANTHC and VSW should
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systematically address these maintenance needs, or some state or regional entity should
establish a revolving loan fund with subsidized interest rates for small utilities.
Funds to Buffer Risk
One maintenance emergency can throw an improving utility into a tailspin, or take it to
the edge. Noatak and Too'gha both had maintenance emergencies that drained their reserves
and set them back substantially. Noatak had reserves to draw on, but Too'gha did not.
In Noatak a pump and control panel at the lift station went out. A replacement pump
was not available, and it took three months to get the pump sent out, rebuilt, returned and
reinstalled. Meanwhile the city had to hire extra labor and the pumper vehicle to move the
sewage from the inoperable lift station to the operating lift station. All in all, the community
incurred about $17,000 in unplanned expenses. It had to cut the budget and reduce operator
hours, thereby performing less O&M. Also, a construction project ruptured the waste heat line,
so the community had to pay for heat rather than use waste heat.
Too’gha experienced tight cash flow during the winter of 1997-98 because of increases
in fuel and electric costs. This experience gave the utility managers a lesson in the seasonal
nature of utility costs. The RUBA staff observed that this seasonality makes the utility
especially susceptible to emergencies or large repairs that drain any cash reserves.
In December 1998, the RUBA staff reported:
The non-profit was doing well, albeit suffering from a cash flow crunch during these
winter months when fuel and electric bills are high. Barring any unforeseen
circumstances or emergencies the utility should be able to tighten its belt and make it
through the winter.10
At the end of the following quarter (March 1999), the RUBA staff reported
Too'gha finances have deteriorated rapidly since the end of last quarter. At the end of
December Too'gha was showing a deficit of approximately $1,700. This has increased to
nearly $12,000 as of March 31st. The primary reason for the rapid decline appears to be
the electrical costs (which have averaged over $2,000 per month for the last four
months).11
The high electrical costs were due to the main well going dry and pumping
continuously through the line to maintain circulation and prevent freezeup of the line. A pump
test on the new water well conducted by the contractor affected water flow to the existing
water well; the existing well went dry. To maintain water flow for the utility, water was
pumped from the new well into the existing well, and from there into the water distribution
system. This dramatically increased electrical and fuel costs for Too'gha.
In early 1999, due to the higher than expected operational costs, the utility manager cut
costs by laying off the alternate operator and improving purchasing and scheduling. VSW
helped the utility by hiring the remaining operator for construction of the new laundromat.
These are examples of utilities doing well, but operating so close to the financial edge
that one breakdown can throw them into failure. The problems then cascade, and it may take
                                                
10 Rural Utility Business Advisor 2rd Quarter FY99 Quarterly Report, Tanana (Too'gha) Activity Report
11 Rural Utility Business Advisor 3rd Quarter FY99 Quarterly Report, Tanana (Too'gha) Activity Report
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years for a utility to recover, assuming no other emergencies happen. When emergencies arise,
outside agency help is critical; small communities have little capacity to buffer this sort of risk.
Villages also feel they don’t have the power to recover damages from utility consultants or
engineers who make mistakes. Small communities need some sort of risk-pooling mechanism.
A revolving loan fund like the clean water revolving fund might be a useful model.
Elements Work in Concert
Figure 1 on page 10 illustrates the idea that effective O&M is a complex,
interdependent system that includes community support, financial resources, management, and
the operator’s time, skills, plans, and procedures. This idea of interdependence is supported in
the RUBA and RMW focus groups. Participants noted improvements in operators’ skills in
both the project and non-project communities, particularly when the utility manager or clerk
and the utility operator had a good relationship. Good rapport, open communications, adequate
supervision, and better utility managers were most often associated with utility operators
having better training and higher certification levels. This strong work relationship was also
linked to the timely ordering and supply of critical parts for the facilities and to the availability
of more funding for the utility. Comments from the focus groups provide examples:
Noatak was a positive outcome for sure. They've worked really hard, the utility manager
has worked awfully hard with the operators and formed good rapport with them, good
communications, and goes over ordering critical spare parts with them. So that's a good
running operation.
Brevig Mission, there you can put a plus by them . . . . Most of the operators are certified
now . . . . They've got excellent city administration. [The whole community backs the
operators.] The new city clerk . . . since she got on they're able to purchase new
equipment . . . . She gets the operators anything they need . . . more training.
RUBAs and RMWs at the focus groups indicated a high correlation between the “good”
operator attitude and communities with rapport between the administrator or clerk and the
operator. The good operator attitude is also tied to communities with high levels of support for
utilities. When community support was lacking or the operator did not have the support of the
utility manager or clerk, the operator was described as having to nag to get spare parts. In
communities with little support for the utilities the operators neither took advantage of nor
were given opportunities to take additional training. In a least two cases where there was little
community support, utility operators were sent to training yet did not apply the knowledge;
they either didn’t try to get certification or left the job entirely.
Longer Project Time
Both Shishmaref and Tanana were funded for two years—initially as Phase I projects,
then again under Phase II. This longer time made a crucial difference for both these
communities. The two-year project also provided us a better opportunity to see the dynamics of
improving water and sewer utilities over a longer period.
Shishmaref experienced several ebbs and flows of success and setbacks over the life of
the project. The grant period of two and a half years allowed the city and agency staff to try a
particular approach, learn from it, try again, learn from the second try, and try a third time.
Improving the community capacity for utility management in Shishmaref took longer than one
year. The City of Shishmaref needed the second year to provide time to consolidate what it had
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learned during the first year. The focused attention of the city, city council, agencies,
contractor, and ANHB over a sustained period brought improvements. The foundation has
been laid for another round of improvements.
Two years of support permitted Too'gha to firmly established its utility and financial
management capabilities and demonstrate its ability to adapt to changing conditions. The
O&M project funds provided the critical seed funds to pay personnel costs while the utility
consolidated its activities. The manager of this utility had started from scratch, setting up the
office, developing a budget, and establishing a manual accounts system. Over the two years of
the project, he progressed to computerized systems for accounting, billing, collections, payroll,
and tracking vendors.
Learning
The pilot project has been about learning—at every level. The communities are learning
to manage their water and sewer facilities and provide O&M; the agencies are learning how to
improve their services to communities; and the researchers are learning to observe and provide
useful feedback. In an earlier section we summarized what the communities themselves felt
they’ve learned. Here we highlight some other lessons and opportunities for learning.
RUBAs understand that their job is teaching, and they have a good curriculum. For
accounting they have developed a graduated process: paper to Excel, then Excel to Quicken or
Quickbooks. Managers or clerks can start at any level, and RUBAs will help them take one
step up. Whatever the system, the emphasis is on up-to-date and timely information for
management and planning.
A paper system gets the utility managers started, and then they move on to
computerized systems. They learn to set up the books in the new system, then spend a period
maintaining dual systems before abandoning the old. The O&M grants help villages focus on
this task and improve their accounting. New Stuyahok is one of the few communities where it
didn’t work. Tanana is an unusual example in that the utility manager progressed rapidly from
hand ledgers to the most sophisticated computer accounting system, Quickbooks Quick Pro 5.
The utility management training is also very well received and likely to show results over a
multi-year period.
When RUBAs go into communities, they provide perspective for planning and
improvement by assessing seven aspects of the utilities (finances, accounting systems, tax
problems, personnel systems, organizational management, leadership, and operation of the
utility). The RMWs concentrate on direct technical assistance, keeping the systems running
and responding to emergencies. Between the two is a missing link: the development of
operations plans, policies, procedures, and paperwork. The RMWs complain about
communities without preventive maintenance plans. But many communities lack knowledge
about how to create such plans. There should be a graduated curriculum for preventative
maintenance planning—from maintenance logs written on the wall to computerized record
keeping. RMWs need to translate from the engineers’ documents to something that works for
the operators.
The RUBA’s quarterly reports with the management score card are valuable tools, but
they could be used in new ways to help community managers and administrators learn. They
could be shared with the communities, to help them monitor their own progress and set
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improvement goals. RUBAs could also solicit community self-evaluations by local managers
or administrators to include with the quarterly reports. Self-evaluation requires staff people to
engage and reflect; it builds planning into their routine. It could help create a relationship
between RUBA and local administrators. It might also develop a record—of what grants exist
and other vital information— for any new administrators when there is job turnover.
Adding an RMW section to the RUBA report, quarterly or annually, would also make
the report more comprehensive and build in more communication between the RUBAs and
RMWs, which currently varies according to the individuals involved.
Another learning opportunity is debriefing after an event. If the RMW, operator, utility
manager and RUBA had, for example, discussed the pump failure in Noatak and how they had
responded, with 20-20 hindsight they might collectively learn to prevent or mitigate expensive
future events. This is in line with “total quality management,” now being emphasized at federal
and other organizations.
The RMWs would like to be consulted more—by engineers, RUBAs, and grant
agencies like ANHB. The focus group had some suggestions for facility planning and design:
• Include RMW input; have RMWs review and mark up design plans.
• Plan systems that are as simple as possible, with consistency between the water plants
and sewer systems.
• Include financial analysis in the planning; analyze the operating costs of alternative
systems and the economic structure of the communities.
Conclusion
Our evaluation of the ANHB’s operation and maintenance demonstration grant program
is synthesized from three primary sources: the data record collected for each community;
interviews with community administrators; and independent observations and assessments
from RUBAs and RMWs. While our research methodology is primarily qualitative, we
attempted to codify and analyze three sets of quantitative measures. These are coding and
tabulation of changes in outcome indicators as documented in the record; statistical analysis of
the RUBA and RMW questionnaires comparing project with non-project communities; and
analysis of public data, specifically EPA records of major drinking water violations. While the
quantitative analysis based on project data (as shown in Figures 2 and 3) suggests widespread
improvements resulting from the project —in both operation and maintenance and in
management—these findings are not robust. Our samples were too small and the variation in
the data too great to allow us to draw statistically significant conclusions.12 Also, our
independent measures do not all concur.
Our qualitative analysis found broad consensus that the ANHB pilot program is a
valuable complement to existing programs. RUBAs, RMWs, and community administrators all
said they would like to see this type of small O&M project grant institutionalized. Based on
our reading of the record, we agree that the ANHB approach makes a unique contribution to
                                                
12 Case study methods do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis. Robust analysis typically requires larger
samples, more precisely defined measures, and quasi-experimental research design to control for the many
variations among communities.
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the joint effort to build water and sewer management and O&M capacity in rural Alaska.
Attributes of the ANHB approach that were widely endorsed include:
• Inclusivity, making the grants accessible to communities with all levels of administrative
capacity
• Emphasis on partnership, both internal and external
• Emphasis on community initiative and design, building strategic planning skills
• Flexibility in the kinds of activities funded as well as the timeline, tailored to the needs and
priorities of each community
• Very personal staff support, including multi-day site visits, generous telephone consultation,
and willingness to talk through or help with any issue
Administrators were grateful that the ANHB staff
worked to tailor programs to the particular needs of their
communities.  Indeed, one of the most frequent praises of the
ANHB staff by community leaders was that each of them had,
at one time or another, come directly to the villages to visit and
try to understand the conditions and circumstances that existed
there.  Another characteristic of the ANHB staff that pleased
administrators was that they encouraged the village to largely
determine their own course. They listened, visited the villages,
offered suggestions about options and possibilities, and were
available for ongoing consultation and support.  Leaders were
then free to consider all options and discuss them with the
community at large. Staff support that was personal, caring, and
educational rather than directive created programs that
community leaders found satisfying and productive.
 The current concept and practice of small, competitive,
flexible O&M grants was broadly endorsed. While community
administrators had not even one critique of the ANHB program,
RUBAs, RMWs and the evaluation team all had some
suggestions for the program, if it were to be ongoing.
• Increase input from RMWs and Native regional corporations in 
processes.
• When evaluating the applications, assess the level of
community involvement and support.
• Require partnership in the work plan and implementation such
that communities have to play an active role and meet certain
criteria.
• Encourage involvement of the schools.
• Encourage utility management training.
• Encourage preventive maintenance planning.The benefit of ANHB
grants [was] . . . that it




vision or purpose on
utility issues. Because it
[the money] was there  .
. . they were a hell of a
lot quicker to grab hold
and spend time to get
focused on that issue
than they would have
been by us going in
solely and saying you
need to deal with utility
management.
Mike Black
RUBA Focus Groupthe application and selectionI think every community
should do a program
such as this because it
makes them start
thinking about what
they really need, and
what they need to do in
the future, what they
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• Encourage projects that plan ahead for a new system and involve the RUBA or LGS, RMW,
and engineers in project planning.
• Consider renewal requests for second year funding to support the long-term process of
capacity building in selected communities.
• Consider delaying a project, or portions of a project, to improve coordination with
construction or other events, in keeping with the larger goals for the project.
• Consider regional projects to build communication, teaching, and sharing of information or
services across communities and to provide opportunities to discuss what communities have
learned from their projects.
• Review and comment on those hired to work on the grant to ensure the best-qualified people
are hired; reduce the influence of family relationships.
• Increase accountability of communities for funds expended, training received, completing
tasks, and addressing the project’s goals. More accountability for tasks may require more
specific work plans and more formal tracking when the work plans are amended.
• Limit the project grants to eight to ten communities per year, to allow for more staff attention
and to lower the expectation that the grant might be a recurring source of funds.
ANHB was very effective in administering these grants. From its easy-to-use quarterly
report formats, to its systems for project tracking and accounting, to its village-savvy staff,
ANHB elicited trust and respect from both communities and agencies. If this type of program
were ongoing, however, it would not necessarily fall to ANHB to administer it. In evaluating
which agency would do that, we note that Alaska Native agencies generally have a big head
start in establishing rapport with villages. It was also useful that ANHB was effectively a
neutral third party on water and sanitation and other community issues.
We also made findings on the types of activities that contribute to long-term
improvements in O&M. We preface the discussion by emphasizing that consistent, committed
leadership and broad support were the key ingredients for success in every case. Where this
was present, these are some strategies that worked to improve utility management or O&M:
• City-tribe cooperation fosters internal partnership, community support, and effective
leadership that are essential to improving water and sewer management and O&M.
• Agency partnership is instrumental for community leaders who are ready to make changes
and welcome outside coaching. Improved communication and coordination between agencies
serving a community also helps community leaders focus and coordinate their efforts.
• Hiring a utility manager or clerk is a strategy for developing focus and expertise in utility
administration and increasing the time and planning devoted to it. This proved to be highly
effective, but perhaps too expensive for small utilities.
• There may be significant opportunities to improve the cost efficiency of old systems through
system maintenance and repairs.
• Enforcing homeowners’ responsibilities can lead customers to take better care of their
plumbing and service lines as well as shift some of the expense from the utility.
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• Community education can inform customers of their responsibilities and coach them on how
to properly use and care for the facilities, thereby lowering maintenance costs.
• Public education about need to pay for utilities and discussion of what the money is used for
• Computerized monthly billing and accounting
• Raffles rewarding customers with zero balances
• Credible enforcement of payment policies
• Rate studies and fee increases
• Improved maintenance and service
• Allocation of gaming revenues to help pay for utilities
•  Capable, committed or aggressive utility managers or clerks
• RUBA coaching and training on financial management
The original purpose of the operation and maintenance (O&M) demonstration grants
was to improve O&M. The Phase II projects focused primarily on educating and involving the
customers and on improving utility management—on the premise that these activities are
fundamental to improving O&M. While several of these cases lend support to that idea, it has
been somewhat disappointing, especially to the RMWs, not to see more direct improvements in
O&M. We note that building community capacity is a long-term strategy and that we should
not expect measurable results in such a short time.
Still, it is useful to remind ourselves that improved O&M is after all the goal, and to
open the agenda to new ideas and strategies to achieve that goal. In the RMW focus group, the
participants emphasized having a current preventive maintenance plan for each utility. To
follow up on this, agencies might direct their attention to preventive maintenance planning and
training. This would allow for thoughtful development of a graduated curriculum for
preventive maintenance planning that RMWs or others could use to make tracking,
implementation and accountability for preventive maintenance understandable and practical for
operators at any level of professional development.
Finally, these case studies highlight an issue that warrants further study and policy
deliberation: the question of whether small, remote communities have the fiscal capacity to
support full-service, Arctic-design water and sewer systems. We found that even the most
capable communities and successful projects in the group are stretched financially. This issue
has three dimensions: meeting the fixed cost of management overhead for small systems;
paying for large, non-routine maintenance and facility upgrade projects; and weathering bad
years—whether due to a poor economy and low revenues or to extraordinary expenses.
